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envy and outsider trading; the case of 
martha stewart 
Jeanne L. Schroeder* 
I. CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 
On March 5, 2004, Martha Stewart was convicted of four counts of 
obstruction of justice, lying to federal investigators, and conspiracy in 
connection with statements she made about her December 2001 sale ot 
approximately 4,000 shares of ImClone Systems, Inc. stock. The tnal 
and its aftermath generated a media storm second only to that of O.L 
Simpson. Although many if not most news accounts dutifully repeated 
the fact that Stewart was not even charged, let alone convicted, of 
insider trading, they frequently referred to the event as the "Martha 
Stewart insider trading case" in tones implying that she was morally, if 
not legally, guilty of that offense as well.i 
In fact, it is far from clear whether Stewart's trades were unlawful, 
let alone illegal, and it is hard to identify any harm her acts directly 
caused anyone.^ Indeed, the only clear harm to date has been to Stewart 
personally and the shareholders of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia 
which stock price has been buffeted by what might be false accusations 
against its eponymous founder. In early March 2003, Martha Stewart 
* Professor of Law, the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York 
City. I would like to thank those who commented on earlier versions of this paper delivered at 
the 2003 Law & Culture Annual Meeting and faculty seminars at the Boston Univers^ Law 
School, Brooklyn Law School, University of Miami Law School, and the Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law I would also like to thank Mara Davis for her research and editing assistance. 
1 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has brought a civil insider trading case 
against Stewart. Although she has not done so at the time this Article went to press, it is widely 
speculated that she will settle these charges rather than risk another tnal. See Deborah Solomon 
driminal Convictions of Stewart. Baconovic Aid SEC's Civil Case, WALL ST. J. Mar. 8, 2004, a 
CI; Charles Gasparino, Martha in Charge?, NEWSWEEK ONLINE, Feb. 25, 2005, available at 
httD://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/70I8932/site/newsweek. .... i 
2 One ground of Stewart's appeal from conviction is that because the judge improperly 
barred her counsel "from arguing that the ImClone trade was perfectly legal," &e jurors may have 
been confused and "were left to make inferences about the propnety of the trade. M^hew Rose 
& Kara Seannell, Lawyers for Stewart, Bacanovic Vow to Appeal, Defense Team Considers a 
Variety of Arguments for Another Court Battle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at C4; also 
Constance L. Hays, Appeal of Stewart Verdict Says Trial Was Full of Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 2004, at C3. 
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Living Omnimedia announced its first ever quarterly losses, which it 
attributed largely to adverse publicity.^ As a result, the price of her own 
stock dropped so much that before her trial she reportedly suffered 
paper losses of approximately $200 million,'* and other losses 
aggregating about $400 million,^ an amount that dwarfs any losses she 
allegedly tried to save by trading ImClone. The price of Martha Stewart 
Omnimedia's stock dropped an additional 23 percent immediately upon 
the announcement of Stewart's conviction.® 
To state what should be obvious, Stewart is not an insider of 
ImClone and is, therefore, incapable of engaging in classic insider 
trading. Nor could she have breached any duty of confidence and 
engaged in the "outsider" trading under the more controversial 
"misappropriation theory." Moreover, to date, no facts have been made 
public that would support a claim that Stewart was a tippee of a classic 
insider. A prosecution of Stewart on insider trading charges would 
require a court to adopt a new interpretation of the law of both 
misappropriation and tipping far beyond existing precedents.'^ 
Consequently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was reduced, in effect, 
to arguing that it was illegal for her to lie about something that was not 
3 See Matthew Rose, Martha Stewart Firm Has Loss as ImClone Inquiries Take Toll, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 5, 2003, at CLL; see also Imelone 10-K available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/765258/000104746904007817/a213091 Oz 10-k.htm. 
4 See W. Michael Cox, Markets Are Quick To Judge When Firms Fail To Behave, 
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 21, 2002, at A17. Plaintiff lawyers filed breach of fiduciary duty 
law suits against Stewart on the theory that she should have known that her "illegal" activities 
would adversely affect the price of Martha Stewart Omnimedia stock and "insider trading" 
actions against other insiders of Martha Stewart Omnimedia on the grounds that, when they sold 
their stock, they must have known that insider trading allegations would eventually be raised 
against Stewart thereby depressing the price of the company's stock. See infra note 8. 
5 See Jeffrey Toobin, Lunch at Martha's; Problems with the Perfect Life, NEW YORKER, 
Feb. 3, 2003, at 38. 
® See Gregory Zuckerman, Martha: The Doyenne of Dilemmas: Fear is Media Buyers, 
Consumers Will Shy Away From Company, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at CI. Stewart's fortunes 
have been recovering. In what looks like a brilliant public relations move, she chose to serve her 
five month prison term pending her appeal. She is now scheduled to star in two new television 
series. See Martha Stewart to Star in New Apprentice, J. NEWS, Feb. 3, 2005, at 9A. The stock 
price of Martha Stewart Omnimedia rebounded to a high of approximately $32 immediately prior 
to her release from prison in early March 2005 from a low of almost $8 following her sentencing. 
See Gregory Zuckerman & James Handler, Martha Stewart Living: No Bars, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 
2001, at CI. 
7 The DOJ's indictment did lay out alleged facts presumably designed to support an 
allegation that Peter Baeanovic, Stewart's fnend, broker, and co-defendant, misappropriated the 
fact that Sam Waksel was trying to sell his ImClone stock from Baeanovic's employer, Merrill 
Lynch, in violation of a duty of confidentiality imposed by his employment agreement and that 
Stewart was Baeanovic's tippee. The indictment did not, however, expressly set forth these legal 
conclusions. This theory forms the heart of the SEC's civil action against Stewart. Stewart's 
lawyers unsuccessfully moved to have this section stricken from the indictment on the grounds 
that it is inflammatory and irrelevant given the fact that she has not been charged with insider 
trading. See Colleen Debaise, Stewart Seeks Dismissal of Charges, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2003, at 
CI2. 
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illegal and that her protestations of innocence constituted the fraud upon 
which she should be considered guilty!« That is, rather than being 
accused of engaging in criminal insider trading, she has been accused of 
obstruction of justice and lying to the government in connection with its 
investigation of her trades. The SEC is seeking restitution from Stewart 
of the approximately $40,000 in avoided losses on the grounds that she 
was a tippee of her broker who "stole" the fact that insiders were selling 
their stock—a novel theory that goes far beyond any other application 
of the misappropriation theory to date. 
In other words, to securities lawyers, the public reaction to the 
Stewart affair appears wholly out of proportion, particularly when 
compared to the obvious corporate improprieties of 2001. What 
percentage of the American public can even identify such figures as 
Jeffrey Skilling, Andrew Fastow,^ Dennis Kozlowski,io John Rigas,ii or 
Scott Sullivan'2—to name but a few potential inductees to the Corporate 
8 The charge that Stewart's statements concerning her ImClone stock constituted fraud upon 
the shareholders of Martha Stewart Omnimedia was eventually thrown out by the trial judge. 
Timothy E. Hoeffher & Risa B. Greene, Prosecutors too Bold, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 12, 2004, at 43. 
However, similar accusations form the basis of a shareholders' suit against Martha Stewart 
Omnimedia. 5ee swpra note 4. 
9 Skilling and Fastow are the former Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, 
respectively, of Enron. Fastow pled guilty to multiple charges of securities fraud. Perhaps more 
well known by the public is the former Chairman of Enron, Kenneth Lay, because of the 
nickname "Kermy Boy" given him by President George W. Bush. Lay and Skilling are to be 
prosecuted for securities fraud in 2006. See 3 Former Enron Executives Will Share a Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 20,2004, at C3. 
10 Kozlowski may have entered into the general public's collective consciousness because 
videos of the notorious toga party he threw for his wife on the island of Sardinia were played at 
his first trial, and were repeatedly aired on television news. Kozlowski was the former CEO of 
Tyco who is currently being retried in New York State for looting the company by causing the 
company to make and then forgive hundreds of millions of dollars of unapproved loans. Once 
again, press reaction reflected more envy than jealousy. Story after story concentrated on 
Kozlowski's ostentatious life style, which included the purchase of a $6,000 shower screen and a 
$15,000 umbrella stand. From the perspective of both securities and corporate law, such 
extravagance per se is irrelevant. What is relevant is that he allegedly used corporate funds for 
this purpose without obtaining board approval or disclosing this remuneration to the public. 
Kozlowski is the subject of a New Yorker magazine article by James Stewart which states that 
Kozlowski, "more than any other executive who had prospered in the great bull market of the 
nineties, came to personify an epoch of corporate fraud, executive greed, and personal 
extravagance." James B. Stewart, Spendl Spendl Spend', NEW YORKER, Feb. 17 & 24, 2003, at 
132. New York's first attempt to convict Kozlowski ended in a mistrial. Based on their negative 
experience in the first trial, the prosecutors are now avoiding appeals to envy and directing the 
jury's attention to the elements of the alleged crimes. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Prosecutors 
Rewrite Script in New Trial of 2 at Tyco, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at CI. 
11 Rigas is the founder and former CEO of Adelphia who was convicted, along with one of 
his sons, of treating this public company as their personal bank account by embezzling hundreds 
of millions of dollars. See Barry Meier, Corporate Conduct: The Overview; 2 Guilty in Fraud at 
a Cable Giant, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at Al. The trial of a second son ended in mistrial. See 
Barry Meier, Michael Rigas Is Free for Now After Mistrial Is Declared, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 
2004, at CI. , 
12 Sullivan is the former WorldCom Chief Financial Officer who oversaw $11 billion in 
fraudulent accounting. The eventual discovery of this fraud led to the filing of the largest 
fwn 
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Hall of Shame? I would bet that few would even recognize the name of 
Sam Waksal, Stewart's friend and former chief of ImClone who is now 
doing jail time for his clear and admitted violation of the insider trading 
rules 
I suggest that the public reaction to the Stewart "scandal" may not 
be so much righteous outrage, but the ignominious sin of envy—the 
pain one feels in seeing another experience joy. Envy is the mirror 
image of schadenfreude^^—the joy one feels in seeing ano er 
experience pain. In this essay I will use the Stewart episode as a 
iumping-off point for analyzing the two competing legal theories of 
unlawful securities trading on the basis of material non-public 
information; the so-called "classic" theory, and the contooversial 
"misappropriation" theory—more accurately termed outsider 
trading"—adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court m the case of United 
States V O'Hagan}^ Although the misappropriation theory is widely 
criticized, I believe that no one, to date, has convincingly explained 
precisely why it seems so intuitively "wrong." . • j 
I posit that the distinction between the ethics of classic insider 
trading and misappropriation precisely reflects the distinction between 
the two often confused—but distinct—passions of jealousy and envy. 
Although the terms are often incorrectly used interchangeably, jealousy 
is the fear and anger one feels when contemplating the possibility tha a 
rival either may take, or has taken, that which one believes rightfii y 
belongs to one. Envy, in contrast, is the anger and pain one feels in 
observing the good fortune of another. . 
Similarly, classic insider trading reflects the fear of investors m a 
public company that rivals—specifically the company's management 
and other fiduciaries—might take what rightfully belongs to investors 
non-public information concerning and obtained from that company. 
To be more precise, I posit that a prohibition on classic insider trading 
law should be seen as a rough corollary to the mandatory disclosure 
regime of the federal securities laws that can be seen as a Congressional 
decision that certain information about publie companies belongs o 
the investment public generally. x 
The misappropriation theory concerns the trading m securities 
based on information received from a source other than the issuer of the 
securities. It is based neither on the principles of federal secunties law 
nor state corporate law, but derives from state trade secret law policy. 
bankruptcy in U.S. history. Sullivan pled guilty to charges 
was a star witness in the successful federal prosecution of former CFO Bernard Ebters. 
13 "Schadenfreude (joy at another's suffering), [is] the inverse of en^ £ 433^^6 ie 
success)... ." Jerome Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 425, 433 (Amelie 
Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) [hereinafter EXPLAINING EMOTIONS]. 
14 521 U.S. 642(1997). 
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This policy is, unfortunately, totally antithetical to securities law policy 
in that it reflects a state decision that the public, generally, has no right 
to certain information so long as it is kept secret. That is, federal 
securities law is about eliminating or reducing informational advantages 
with respect to one class of information, while state trade secret law is 
about protecting informational advantages with respect to another class 
of information. 
The misappropriation theory, consequently, involves the 
resentment by the investment public that other persons have the good 
fortune to enjoy something to which the public has no right—^non­
public information obtained from third party sourees who are the legally 
recognized owners of the information. 
The ethical status of jealousy and envy are completely diverse. In 
jealousy one wants to protect what one has or believes one should have. 
In envy, one wants to destroy the possession of another. Jealousy is the 
assertion of one's own claim of possession. Envy is the wish to destroy 
the enjoyment of another whether or not it is rightful. Jealousy may not 
be an attractive emotion, but even God admits that He is jealous. Envy, 
however, is one of the seven deadly sins. Indeed, it is second only to 
pride in its potentially corruptive effect on the soul. As etymology 
reveals, envy—invidia—is the most invidious sin. 
We need to remember, however, that sometimes even paranoiacs 
have real enemies. Perhaps it is also true that what first appears to be 
envy might, upon eloser look, seem more like jealousy. That is, it might 
be the case that certain informational advantages that the law currently 
allocates to specific individuals should, for one policy reason or 
another, be allocated to the public. As Jerome Neu accurately says in 
his analysis of envy: 
That envy may be one reason for demanding equality does not mean 
that demands for equality are unjustified.... [Tjhere are other 
reasons, most importantly reasons of justice, for demanding (certain 
forms of) equality. But from another perspective the real issue is 
whether envy must form an inevitable obstacle to attempts to achieve 
justice and/or equality.^^ 
In this Article, I propose an internally consistent analysis of insider 
trading law based on any given allocation of property rights in non­
public information. I am not, however, offering an apologia for the 
status quo. I believe the current case law is, and is doomed to remain, 
hopelessly inadequate because the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
federal securities laws requires the government to force the square peg 
of insider trading into the round hole of actual fraud. This inevitably 
causes ambiguities that create the opportunity for prosecutorial abuse— 
15 Jerome Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 435. 
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as Vaffaire Stewart illustrates. I believe that Congress should address 
the appropriate allocation of informational advantages based on the 
competing policies imderlying the federal securities laws and trade 
secret law, among other ethical, legal, economic, and political 
considerations. 
This Article proceeds as follows. First, I analyze the distinction 
between envy and jealousy from theological, psychoanalj^ical and 
philosophic perspectives. I will then explain the two rival theories of 
unlawful trading on the basis of material non-public information. 
Finally, I apply this analysis to insider trading law to explain that the 
misappropriation theory is incoherent and internally inconsistent 
because it attempts to piggy-back insider trading law on trade secret 
principles. The principles underlying these two different fields of law 
are logically antithetical. 
The prohibition against insider trading implicitly reflects a 
Congressional determination that investors in a public company have a 
beneficial interest in material non-public information about, and in the 
possession of, that eompany. It reflects a rare egalitarian moment 
within our generally individualistic, libertarian property regime. The 
public is, therefore, rightfully jealous if a traditional insider of a public 
company having privileged access to this type of information were to 
exploit it for her own advantage without sharing it with the public. In 
contrast, trade secret law is premised on the determination that the right 
to control and commercially exploit certain other categories of 
information resides exclusively in specific individuals and that the 
public generally has no such rights—it is fundamentally individualistie 
and monopolistic. For the government to assert that the investment 
public is defrauded when this information is used to trade in securities 
reflects envy. 
II. ENVY AND JEALOUSY 
A. Martha, Martha, Martha! 
After I admired the silver chopsticks that had been set out, Stewart 
said, "You know, in China they say, 'The thinner the chopsticks, the 
higher the social status.' Of course, I got the thinnest I could find." 
After a pause, she added, "That's why people hate me."'^ 
The causes of the fracas about Martha Stewart are no doubt over-
determined, involving among other things the misogyny of the public 
towards powerful women generally, Stewart's carefully developed, but 
Toobin, supra note 5, at 39. 
E N V Y  A N D  O U T S I D E R  T R A D I N G  
aimoyingly smug perfectionist public image specifically, as well as 
widespread public misunderstanding that all trading based on non­
public information or secret tips is generally unlawful.^'' I ar^e that it 
also illustrates that envy is a strong component of "outsider" trading 
law. Stewart's image inspires admiration, as well as ridicule and 
backbiting. As stated in an article on CNN.com concerning the effect of 
the insider trading allegations on Stewart s public image. 
The public has long had a love-hate relationship with Stewart. She is 
widely admired for her design and business acumen even as she's 
disparaged for her perfectionist impulses and sheer omnipresence. 
Indeed, the infuriating thing about Stewart is that, although she presents 
each of her suggested projects as eminently doable, it would be 
inconceivable to accomplish all of the projects suggested in even any 
one-hour show. That is, she inspires guilt because she presents her 
world as being both possible and impossible for anyone except her. As 
stated in a Washington Post article, Stewart's ostensible message is 
always "You can be just like me."i9 Her implicit message, however, is 
"Dream on!" 1 have to admit, that for all my feminist pretensions, she 
makes me green with envy. 
Consequently, the press typically describe this successful 
entrepreneur, publisher, television personality, and former CEO of a 
New York Stock Exchange-listed corporation by such condescending 
terms as "homemaking," "domestic" or "lifestyle queen, 
"guru,"22 or "diva."23 But, how could she complain when this is 
precisely the image she has promoted? 
17 As argued in a Wall Street Journal piece appearing the first trading day after the 
conviction; „ ^ , 
The culture demands scapegoats after periods of excess. So prosecutors and a 
convinced jury—made an example of Martha Stewart The trial, of comse, had 
nothing to do with individual investors losing money. Instead, it was ahout how Ms. 
Stewart and her brokers dealt with prosecutors, who were legitimately demanding 
honesty. Nevertheless, [a juror's] comments perfectly capture a general sense of 
outrage. Martha, by dint of her famous persona, seems to have been convicted, m part, 
of Trading While Rich. w a i t  c t  i  
Jesse Eisinger, The Show Goes On: Show Trials are Easier than Lasting Reform, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 8,2004, at CI. , . 
18 Stewart Image Coming Under Attack, CNN.com June 25 2002 n 
http://www.cnn.coni/2002/SHOWBlZ/News/06/25/martha.stewart (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) 
tfisreimftsx Image Coming Under Attack], 
19 Paula Span, Martha: In the Soup, GOTRIAD.com, Mar. 16, 2003, at 
httD://www.gotriad.com/article/articleview/3361/l/20/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
20 Martha Stewart in Hot Water Over Possible Insider Trading, BONGO NEWS, June 19, 
2002, available at http://www.bongonews.coni/layoutl.php?event=178. 
21 Image Coming Under Attack, supra note 18. 
22 Judge in Trial Threat to Waksal, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at 27. 
23 Cox, supra note 4, at A17. 
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B. The Passions Defined 
It is my thesis that the confused analysis that treats 
misappropriation or "outsider trading" as equivalent to classic "insider 
trading" reflects the common conflation of envy and jealousy. 
Although the two passions overlap, they are analytically distinct. Most 
importantly, the ethical dimensions of the two are completely diverse. 
Since at least the sixth century when St. Gregory the Great added it to 
his list, envy has been considered one of the seven deadly sins^'^—^not 
merely a wrongful act, but a disposition that corrupts the soul and serves 
as the occasion of additional sins.^^ Ethics suggests that we should, 
therefore, distinguish between the two. According to both theology and 
psychoanalytic theory, the difficulty in isolating envy from jealousy lies 
in the fact that envy, albeit radically evil, lies at the heart of human 
nature. 
1. Envy as Deadly Sin 
St. Augustine famously argued in his Confessions that the presence 
of envy in the heart of even the youngest children was evidence of the 
imiversality of Original Sin.^^ He called envy "the diabolical sin."^^ 
This concept builds on St. Paul's statement in the First Letter to the 
Corinthians that "Love envieth not."^^ 
The Catholic Catechism identifies envy, along with avarice, as the 
concern of the tenth, and final Commandment—thou shalt not covet thy 
neighbor's property. According to the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops: "The tenth commandment concerns the intentions of 
the heart;... it summarizes all the precepts of the Law."^^ The 
Catechism defines envy as: 
24 See Mary Ashwin, . . Against All Other Virtue and Goodness" An Exploration of Envy 
in Relation to Concepts of Sin, available at http://www.human-nature.com/fi-ee-
associations/ashwin.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
25 Neu holds out the hope that there can be admiring envy as well as malicious envy. "In the 
case of admiring envy, one wishes to raise oneself (to become like the other)." Jerome Neu, 
Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 434. I do not believe that this 
form of admiration accurately fits within the category of envy. As even Neu admits, what he calls 
admiring envy "may have different instinctual sources and developmental paths" than malicious 
envy. Id. 
25 See infra text at notes 57-60. 
27 St. Augustine, De catechizandis rudibus. 
28 I Corinthians 13.4 (American Standard Version). 
29 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH, Article 10, The Tenth Commandment, ^ 2534, available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/ 
catechism/text/pt3sect2chpt2artl0.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
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[T]he sadness at the sight of another's goods and the immoderate 
desire to acquire them for oneself, even unjustly. When it wishes 
g r a v e  h a r m  t o  a  n e i g h b o r  i t  i s  a  m o r t a l  s i n  . . .  .  
Envy represents a form of sadness and therefore a refusal of 
charity.^" 
Envy is both ethically and "historicaily" the second deadly sin, 
next only to pride.^^ According to a standard interpretation of the Bible 
the first sin in the universe was Lucifer's pride that led him to lead the 
revolt of the rebel angels against God. The second sin was Lucifer's 
envy of Adam and Eve. Driven to destroy their happiness, Lucifer, in 
the form of the serpent, appealed to their pride—^the first human sin— 
and seduced them into disobedience. That is, the serpent convinced Eve 
that if she ate of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, she 
would become like God. This led, once again, to envy as the second 
human sin when Cain, infuriated by his envy at Abel's good fortune, 
killed his brother. Consequently, the Bible states that "by the envy of 
the Devil, death entered into the world, and who are of his portion make 
trial thereof."^^ 
In the twentieth century, psychoanalysts Sigmund Freud and 
Jacques Lacan seized on this tradition to make envy central to 
psychoanalytic theory. Lacan's followers have argued that envy is not 
merely an individual sin, but the source of racism, anti-semitism, 
terrorism, and the other horrors of contemporary life. Melanie Klein 
hased a large part on her psychoanalytic theory on the concept of envy, 
which she describes as "the angry feeling that another person possesses 
and enjoys something desirable—the envious impulse being to take it 
away or to spoil it."^^ She contrasts it to its opposite, "gratitude."^'^ She 
offers a psychoanalytic reason "why envy ranks among the seven 
'deadly sins'" and "suggests[s] that it is unconsciously felt to be the 
greatest sin of all, because it spoils and harms the good object which is 
the source of life."^^ 
Envy is a particularly cancerous sin in that its goal is nothing but 
the destruction of the good. In Chaucer's words, "[i]t is the worst of 
sins as it sets itself against all other virtues and goodness ... As the 
Ulanovs explain: 
30 Id. M 2539-40. 
3' See Ashwin, supra note 24. 
32 WISDOM OF SOLOMON 2:24 (American Standard Version). 
33 MELANIE KLEIN, ENVY AND GRATITUDE AND OTHER WORKS 1946-1963, at 176, 181 
(1984). 
34 Id. at 186-88. 
35 Id. at 189. 
36 GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES (The Parson's Tale), quoted in Ashwin, 
supra note 24. 
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At first glance, envy seems to differ from other sins because they 
each point to a goal in itself not evil, except when indulged to excess. 
Gluttony is hunger gone wild, for example. Lust is sexual desire run 
rampant. Anger is self-assertion enraged. In contrast, envy presents 
itself as feeling demeaned by another's good fortune and wanting to 
belittle the other's good to protect oneself. Envy wants to make 
something alive into something dead.^' 
2. Jealousy and Theft of Property 
Jealousy is the fear and anger one feels that a rival will steal away 
that which is rightfully hers. Envy is the rancor and bitterness one feels 
when observing the good fortune of another. As Mary Ashwin 
describes it: 
[E]nvy comes from the Latin invidere: to look upon 
maliciously [I]t is the feeling of mortification when we 
contemplate another's advantages; it is the need to spitefully criticize 
and denigrate; it is the fear that others are getting more than their fair 
share.^^ 
She continues: 
Jealousy is the affect in a triangular situation when a person fears 
that something that they believe belongs to them has been or is about 
to be taken away. Essentially the difference between envy and 
jealousy is that envy is between two objects; jealousy between 
three.^^ 
Klein describes the distinction as follows: 
[Ejnvy implies the subject's relation to one person 
only Jealousy is based on envy, but involves a relation to at 
least two people; it is mainly concerned with love that the subject 
feels is his due and has been taken away, or is in danger of being 
taken away, from him by his rival.'"' 
In Neu's words: 
Jealousy is typically over what one possesses and fears to lose, while 
envy may be over something one has never possessed and may never 
hope to possess. Going with this, the focus of envy is typically the 
other person, rather than the particular thing or quality one is envious 
over (a thing that may not in itself even be desirable to the envier, 
whatever its perceived value to the present possessor)."^' 
37 ANA ULANOV & BARRY ULANOV, CINDERELLA AND HER SISTERS: THE ENVIED AND THE 
ENVYING 91 (1993). 
38 Ashwin, supra note 24. 
39 Id 
40 KLEIN, supra note 33, at 181. 
41 Jerome Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 432-33. 
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In other words, the difference between jealousy and envy is that 
the former is triangular while the latter is bilateral. That is, the jealous 
party is concerned to protect or obtain the possession of an object oj 
desire to the exclusion of a real or imagined rival.^^ The jealous is 
concerned with insuring her own jouissance—a technical 
psychoanalytic term that for our limited purposes can be somewhat 
inaccurately translated as "enjoyment." In contrast, the envious is 
concerned with preventing or destroying the jouissance of the other. 
The envious does not so much want to obtain, possess, or enjoy t e 
object of desire for its own sake. Rather, the envious just wants to 
destroy the rival's excess enjoyment in her object by taking it away or 
destroying it. . j • t-
The difference between jealousy and envy is illustrated in Freud s 
interpretation of the story of the judgment of Solomon. As is well 
known it is recounted in the book of Kings that two prostitutes living 
together, perhaps in the same brothel,''^ gave birth to boys within days 
of each other. One of the women came to Solomon alleging that the 
child of the other woman died "because she lay on it The mother of 
the dead boy took its corpse and laid it by the side of the plaintiff while 
stealing the living child and placing it in the defendant's bed^ When 
arose in the morning to nurse my child, behold, it was dead; but when I 
looked at it closely in the morning, behold, it was not the child I had 
bome.'"^5 Solomon, of course, ordered: 
"Divide the child in two, and give half to the one, and half to the 
other." Then the woman whose son was alive said to the king, 
because her heart yearned for her son, "Oh, my lord, give her the 
living child, and by no means slay it." But the other said, It shall be 
neither mine nor yours; divide it." The king answered and said, 
"Give the living child to the first woman, and by no means slay it; 
she is its mother." And all Israel heard of the judgment which the 
king had rendered; and they stood in awe of the king, because they 
perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to render justice. 
42 Neu maintains that "DJealousy is typically over people while envy 
Qualities " Id at 433 As a Hegelian, I find this analysis to be backwards, and argue that jealousy 
Sies more^^aro^^^^^^^ to tLgs. Indeed, when a person is the object of jealousy, this 
orecisely that the jealous treats the person who is the object of his desire as precisely &at an 
Liect In other words, Neu believes that jealousy with respect to things is the treataent of 
Sects aTsSects, wh;reas 1 believe that jealousy with respect to people is the treatment of 
subjects as objects. 
43 They"dwell[ed]inthesamehouse." lXmgs3:16. 
44 Id Today, we would probably assume that the unfortunate infant succumbed to Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome. Traditionally however, it was assumed that the infan was smothered 
leiuse Wrwhrrish mother rolled over him while in a drunken stupor or while entertaining a 
client. This was how this story was told to me in Sunday school. 
45 Id at 3:21. 
46 Id at 3:25-28. 
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Solomon is extolled for his wisdom in identifying the true mother 
by her concern for the child. A supposedly more sophisticated version 
of this is that Solomon wisely identified, not necessarily the biological 
parent of the child, but the woman who would be a better parent. 
Freud correctly points out the fallaciousness of this interpretation. 
The fact that the plaintiff tried to protect the innocent child neither 
proved that she was his mother nor that she was even benevolent. All it 
showed was that she was not psychotic. 
Rather, Solomon's wisdom lay in his identification of which 
woman was more likely to harm the child in the future. Solomon was, 
in effect, testing the truth of the plaintiffs accusation. The only 
possible explanation for the behavior charged by the plaintiff was that 
the defendant was envious to the point of madness. A woman who 
would steal the child of another could not be driven by jealousy. She 
could not fear losing her own son—this had already happened—and no 
one else's child could be a substitute for the uniqueness of an individual 
who had been lost. Rather, bereft of the joys of motherhood, the 
defendant could not bear to see the plaintiffs joy. The defendant stole 
the living child not so that she would have him, but so that the plaintiff 
would not. Solomon understood that ordering the death of the living 
child would reveal the true jouissance of the defendant. And indeed, 
the defendant's enjoyment was in destruction—envy. In contrast, the 
jouissance of a "true" mother would be the love of her child. She might 
be expected to be jealous—frantic that that which by right belonged to 
her (her child) might be taken by a rival—^but her love should overcome 
this jealousy if she thought that the altemative was losing her child 
through death. • u ^ i 
Envy is always sinful. In contrast, jealousy can be either nghtful 
or wrongful. For example, Yahweh correctly describes His passion as 
jealousy, not envy. By definition, God's passions are righteous. The all 
powerful, all confident Yahweh could not conceivably be envious of 
Baal and the other false gods. And yet. He can fear that His chosen, but 
weak, people might be seduced away by the idols. The history 
recounted by the Bible suggests that this fear was frequently justified.^^ 
47 In recent times, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley have suggested an egregiously incorrect 
interpretation of this story. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a 
Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995). 
48 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, in 18 THE STANDARD 
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 67, 120-21 (James 
Strachey et al. eds., 1974); John Forrester, Psychoanalysis and the History of the Passions: The 
Strange Destiny of Envy, in FREUD AND THE PASSIONS 127, 128-29 (John O'Neill ed., 1996). 
49 For example, Solomon, because of the love of his "many foreign woman ... seven hundred 
wives, princesses, and three hundred concubines ... tumed away his heart after other gods; and 
his heart was not wholly true to the Lord his God " 1 Kings 11:1-5. 
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Jealousy can be wrong if it is unjustified or misplaced. An 
example of the former is the jealous spouse irrationally fears that his 
faithful spouse will betray him. The classic illustration of the 
distinction between wrongful jealousy and envy is the contrast between 
Othello and lago—^the envious lago is evil, the jealous Othello merely 
tragic.^" Many misogynist practices—such as purdah—are the 
institutionalization of unjustified jealousy. 
When it is misplaced, the jealous party may have no rightful claim 
to the object to desire. The phenomenon of stalking is a fnghtening 
example of wrongful jealousy—the stalker fears the "loss" of the 
beloved who, in fact, never was his. Moreover, stalking is the point 
where wrongful jealousy threatens to pass over to envy—as when 
Othello strangles Desdemona. 
C. Psychoanalysis 
Envy plays a central role in the psychoanalytic tradition associated 
with Freud. Freud's theory of the role of penis envy in the feminine 
psyche is notorious. His followers take a more radical position. For 
example, without denying Freud's account of penis envy in the oedipal 
stage of development, Klein argues that envy is an essential 
constitutional basis of all personality, masculine and feminine, that 
arises much earlier in the infant's development and derives from the 
child's empirical experience of the maternal breast (or substitute). It is 
"operative from the beginning of life."5i Lacan takes Freud's analysis 
of envy to an even higher, philosophic level. 
I find Freud and Klein's accounts of the origins unsatisfactory 
because they claim to be empirical and, therefore, deterministic. 
Lacan's account, in contrast, is theoretical and retrospective. That is, 
Freud seems to believe that children go through a stage in their lives 
when they literally wish to have sex with their mothers and kill their 
fathers. Girls literally are so impressed with the sight of a penis that 
they feel lacking the rest of their lives. Lacan, in contrast, states that 
"the Oedipus complex is Freud's dream. Like all dreams it needs to be 
interpreted."^^ indeed, according to Lacan, even Oedipus did not have 
an Oedipal complex.^^ 
50 Jerome Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 432-33. 
51 KLEIN, supra note 33, at 176. 
52 JACQUES LACAN, SEMINAIRE LIVRE XVII: L'ENVERS DE LA PSYCHANALYSE 159 (Jacques-
Alain Miller ed., 1991). 
53 See Jacques LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN BOOK VIE THE ETHICS OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 1959-1960, at 304 (Dennis Porter trans. & Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1992) 
(1988). 
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Similarly, Klein's object psychology is based on the proposition 
that from the time of birth children literally form relationships based on 
the mother's breast. She quoted approvingly Freud's analogy of 
psychoanalysis to archeology: 
His [the psycho-analyst's] work of constmction, or, if it is preferred, 
of reconstmction, resembles to a great extent an archaeologist s 
excavation of some dwelling-place that has been destroyed and 
buried or of some ancient edifice. The two processes are in fact 
identical, except that the analyst works under better conditions and 
has more material at his command to assist him, since what he is 
dealing with is not something destroyed but something that is still 
alive—and perhaps for another reason as well. But just as the 
archaeologist builds up the walls of the building from the 
foundations that have remained standing, determines the number and 
position of the columns from depressions in the floor and 
reconstmcts the mural decorations and paintings from the remains 
found in the debris, so does the analyst proceed when he draws his 
inferences from ... the behaviour of the subject of the analysis.^'* 
The advantage to this approach is also its disadvantage—it arguably 
makes their theories falsifiable. If one studied infants and could show 
that they did not literally go through these stages, then the theories 
would be disproved. 
Lacan, in contrast, works not only within the psychoanalytic 
tradition but also within the speculative philosophical tradition that is 
based on a study of human freedom." Consequently, he seeks to 
eliminate any remaining biological determinism from Freud's theory. 
He seeks not to recover the child who once was, but to help the adult 
understand the person she is now. Lacan, following Hegel and Kant, 
posits that if the subject is essentially free, it is because subjectivity is 
nothing but a radical negativity. That is, the subject is subjected to no 
boundaries only because it has no positive characteristics. The Oedipal 
romance is, in a Lacanian reading, a sort of false-autobiography that we 
retroactively tell ourselves in order to explain, and give affirmative 
content to, our essential emptiness. Its very determinism is comforting 
not only because it seems to explain the modem subject's feeling of 
alienation, but also because it places the blame for her condition 
elsewhere. As I shall explain in the next section, envy is one possible 
reaction that a subject can have when she is forced to confront her 
constituent negativity. 
54 KLEIN, supra note 33, at 177-78 (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, CONSTRUCTIONS IN ANALYSIS 
(1937)). 
55 I explain this at length in Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality 
and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (2002), and shall give only an abbreviated 
account of Lacan's theory in the immediately following section. 
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D. Lacan 
The centrality of envy in Lacan's psychoanalytic theory can be 
seen in his repeated references to a passage in the Confessions of St. 
Augustine.56 Ag noted, St. Augustine answered the critics of the 
doctrine of original sin who maintained a romantic belief in the 
innocence of children with the following anecdote. "I myself have seen 
and known even a baby envious; it could not speak, yet it turned pale 
and looked bitterly on its foster-brother."" Lacan explains how the 
passion identified by Augustine, which is sometimes translated as 
"jealousy," is more correctly understood as "envy." Lacan points out 
that the word envy, the Latin "invidia " comes, in turn, from videre—io 
see.^^ It is the passion felt in seeing the enjoyment of the other. 
In order to understand what invidia is in its function as gaze it must 
not be confused with jealousy. What the small child, or whoever, 
envies is not at all necessarily what he might want—avoir envie, as 
one improperly puts it. Who can say that the child who looks at his 
younger brother still needs to be at the breast? Everyone knows that 
envy is usually aroused by the possession of goods which would be 
of no use to the person who is envious of them, and about the true 
nature of which he does not have the least idea.^^ 
That is, Augustine's point is not that the child jealously fears the loss of 
the maternal breast. The bitter child has already been weaned and is 
well-fed. Rather, it is the very sight of his brother's enjoyment that fills 
him with envy. Consequently, he does not want to regain the breast, 
just to take it away from his hated little brother. This is sin. 
Lacan agrees with Augustine that envy needs to be guarded against 
because it leads not only to personal and social evils, but also because it 
is constitutive of personality itself and, therefore, particularly invidious. 
A full account of Lacanian theory is far beyond the scope of this 
Article. For our purposes suffice it to say that Lacan goes beyond 
Freud's theory of penis envy and Klein's theory of breast envy, with 
their lingering aura of crude biological determinism. Lacan posits that 
56 As discussed by Shuli Barzilai, "[References to the anecdote appear in Lacan's writings 
from The Family Complexes (1938) to Encore (1973)." Shuli Barzilai, Augustine in Contexts: 
Lacan's Repetition of a Scene From the Confessions, 11 LIT. & THEOLOGY 201 (1997). 
57 "'Vidi ego et expertus sum zelantem parvulum, non dum loquehatur, et intuebatur pallidus 
amaro aspectu conlactaneum suum." THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 11 (Edward B. 
Pusey trans. & Charles W. Eliot eds., 1909). In this passage, rather than using the more common 
"invidere," Augustine uses the relatively unusual word "zelantem" which some other translators 
have rendered as "jealousy." See, e.g., Barzilai, supra note 56. As Lacan's analysis explains, the 
immediately following text explains that Augustine is referring to the passion that I am calling 
envy, not jealousy. 
58 See JACQUES LACAN, FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 116 (Alan 
Sheridan trans. & Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1981). 
59 Id. 
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the very initiation of the subjeet into the symbolic realm of language, 
law and sexuality "splits" the subject leaving her with an insatiable 
feeling of lack.^" Or, more accurately, as I have said elsewhere, the 
"subject is split" is not so much a description but a definition— 
subjectivity is nothing but an internal, constituent emptiness or 
splitting.®' 
To oversimplify, following Hegel, Lacan thought that subjectivity 
could only be created through intersubjective relationships with 
o t h e r s — w h a t  h e  c a l l e d  t h e  s y m b o l i c  o r d e r  o f  t h e  b i g  O t h e r . T h e  
subject is nothing but this hollow shell that gains content from the 
outside. Consequently, one's most intimate self lies external to oneself. 
Lacan coined the neologism "extimacy" to describe the uncanny sense 
of one's own self-alienation.®^ This constitutive lack appears even more 
negative when one realizes that the Other who gives the subject content 
also "does not exist."®'' That is, the intersubjective order of the 
symbolic has no pre-existing, objective, and permanent essence but 
consists merely of a contingent, intersubjective, and temporary 
appearance of specific, fleeting social relations among a community of 
split subjects. 
Lacan will eventually combine his insight that the subject is split, 
and that the Other does not exist, to formulate his single most 
controversial slogan "Woman does not exist."®® Although frequently 
dismissed as misogyny, Lacan's statement is more correctly interpreted 
as a statement of the human condition. To Lacan, true subjectivity is 
I explain this phenomenon at length elsewhere. See, e.g., JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE 
VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE FEMININE (1998) [hereinafter 
SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL]; JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF 
THE MARKET (2003) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, 
The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 687, 731-35 
[hereinafter Schroeder, The Midas Touch]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A 
Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 505-06 (1998) [hereinafter 
Schroeder, The End of the Market]. The following text in the main body is an abbreviated 
version of these more complete discussions. 
6' See Jeaime L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses of Law: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal 
Practice and Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2000) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Four 
Discourses]; see also BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND 
JOUISSANCE 45 (1995). 
62 I explicate Hegel and Lacan's theory of the formation of subjectivity extensively in 
SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60, at 1-106 and Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's 
Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gift, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815, 860-62 (1999) [hereinafter Schroeder, 
Pandora's Amphora]. 
63 In French, extimite. Jearme L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Kenneth Starr: 
Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 653, 659-60 n.31 (2000). See generally Jacques-Alain 
Miller, Extimite (Franfoise Massardier-Kenney trans.), in LACANIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE: 
SUBJECT, STRUCTURE AND SOCIETY 74 (March Bracher et al. eds., 1994). 
64 Miller, supra note 63, at 81. 
65 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK XX: ENCORE, ON FEMININE 
SEXUALITY, THE LIMITS OF LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE 1972-1973, at 72-74 (Bruce Fink trans. & 
Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1998). 
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feminine in nature—^the feminine is the part of personality that 
internalizes the fact of her own negativity-^® The masculine is the part 
that denies the truth. Or, to paraphrase Lacanian philosopher Slavoj 
:£izek, a man is a woman who thinks she exists.®^ 
The subject seeks an explanation of her sense of lack by 
formulating a retroactive account (an abduction or retroduction) of what 
must have happened. One way she does this is by identifying her lack 
of enjoyment (completion) with the excess enjoyment of someone else. 
She obsesses on the other's enjoyment and concludes that not only does 
the other enjoy, he does so excessively while she, in contrast, is lacking. 
She speculates that the reason why she lacks enjoyment and the other 
enjoys too much must be that the other has stolen her enjoyment. In 
^izek's words: 
What we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is 
the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen 
from us: the lack ("castration") is originary, enjoyment constitutes 
itself as "stolen," or, to quote Hegel's precise formulation from his 
Science of Logic, it "only comes to be through being left behind."^^ 
This is a false autobiography. Through this self-serving account, the 
subject tries to disguise her sinful envy as righteous jealousy—XhQXQhy 
shifting the blame from herself to the "thieving" other. This is both 
sinful and unjust. 
Lacanians have extended and applied Lacan's theory of excess 
enjoyment to the political field. We associate the other who has excess 
enjoyment with other groups with which we are proximate. We 
concentrate on the difference in the way the other, with his strange 
customs, enjoys. For example, Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan's son-in-
law and editor, states: 
Now, what we are attempting to see is what makes the Other other, 
that is, what makes it particular, different, and in this dimension of 
alterity of the Other, we find war. Racism, for example, is precisely 
a question of the relation to an Other as such, conceived in its 
difference. And it does not seem to me that any of the generous and 
rmiversal discourses on the theme of "we are all fellow beings" have 
had any effectiveness conceming this question. Why? Because 
racism calls into play a hatred that is directed precisely toward what 
grounds the Other's alterity, in other words, its jouissance. If no 
decision, no will, no amount of reasoning is sufficient to wipe out 
racism, this is indeed because it is founded on the point of extimacy 
of the Other. 
66 See SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60, at 328-29. 
67 See SLAVOJ 2IZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 75 (1989). 
68 SLAVOJ IHEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE; KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF 
IDEOLOGY 203-04 (1993). 
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It is not simply a mater of an imaginary aggressivity that, itself, is 
directed at fellow beings. Racism is founded on what one imagines 
about the Other's jouissance\ it is hatred of the particular way, of the 
Other's own way, of experiencingyowz'ssance. . . . However, what is 
really at stake is that he takes his jouissance in a way different from 
ours. Thus the Other's proximity exacerbates racism: as soon as 
there is closeness, there is a confrontation of incompatible modes of 
jouissance. For it is simple to love one's neighbor when he is 
distant, but it is a different matter in proximity. 
Racist stories are always about the way in which the Other obtains 
a plus-de-jouir. either he does not work or he does not work enough, 
or he is useless or a little too useful, but whatever the case may be, 
he is always endowed with a part of jouissance that he does not 
deserve. Thus true intolerance is the intolerance of the Other's 
jouissance.^^ 
As Lacan says (in explanation of Augustine's anecdote): 
Such is true envy—^the envy that makes the subject pale before the 
image of a completeness closed upon itself, before the idea that the 
petit a, the separated a from which he is hanging, may be for another 
the possession that gives satisfaction . .. 
Note that the theory of the relationship between the theory of 
excess enjoyment and racism lies precisely at the moment at which 
jealousy passes into envy—or, more accurately, when the guilty subject 
tries to disguise her sinful and deceitful envy as righteous jealousy. The 
subject pretends to be jealous—she tries to insist that the reason she is 
angry is because the Other has taken away that which is rightfully hers. 
But in her heart, she knows that her lack is constituent and is not caused 
by the absence of any specific thing. Consequently, what she really 
feels is envy. She is incensed at the supposed enjoyment of the Other in 
which she cannot participate. 
All she can do, therefore, is try to destroy the other's enjoyment. 
Unfortunately, because the subject identifies the other's enjoyment with 
the other's alterity (i.e., whatever it is that distinguishes the other from 
the subject) destruction of the other's enjoyment requires the destruction 
of the other. Accordingly, in Lacan's late seminar. Encore, Lacan 
invents the neo-logism 'jealouissance" for the envy of the excess 
enjoyment (jouissance) of the other first identified by Augustine.^' 
Historically, as demonstrated in such examples of Lynch mobs, the 
Holocaust, the Serbian wars and, today, Islamacism and, perhaps. 
President Bush's invocation to the "Axis of Evil," this impulse becomes 
literal as political reality. 
69 Miller, supra note 63, at 79-80. 
^0 LACAN, supra note 58, at 116. 
71 See LACAN, supra note 65, at 100. 
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E. Law 
Freud identified envy as the souree of our sense of social justice. 
"If one cannot be the favourite oneself, at all events nobody else shall 
be the favourite."''^ But Freud thinks that humans are not naturally herd 
animals with benevolent social instincts." Liberal legal theory, as well 
as Lacanian psychoanalysis, suggests that the matter is more 
complicated. Social justice requires that we distinguish righteous 
jealousy from destructive envy—^we must not merely claim property 
rights for ourselves, we must respect the property of others. As I have 
already quoted: "That envy may be one reason for demanding equality 
does not mean that demands for equality are unjustified."" 
Although I base my legal theory on the super-liberalism of Hegel, 
this is equally true of classic liberal theory associated with Locke. To 
Locke property is a natural right that pre-exists society." Under this 
interpretation liberalism requires that we respect property rights. This 
means that appropriate jealousy—^the protection of valid property 
rights^^—is necessary even as envy—^the desire to destroy the property 
rights of others—must be prohibited. 
To Hegel, property and liberal society are self-constituting— 
property is created by liberal society, but liberal society logically 
requires property as its cornerstone.''^ This can be seen as a 
fundamental principle of Hegel's philosophy of right. To Hegel, the 
abstract individual posited by classical liberalism is too frail a creature 
to act as a subject—a creature capable of bearing rights and interacting 
in the symbolic order of society.'^ Related to this, he thinks that 
subjectivity could not exist in the state of nature posited by liberalism 
because one can only be a subject insofar as one is recognized as such 
by another subject." Consequently, the person seeking subjectivity 
must first seek to give other persons the status and dignity of 
72 Freud, supra note 48, at 119-20. 
73 See id 
74 xwpra text at note 15. 
75 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Umv. 
Press 1988) (1690). • u- , u 
76 Neu maintains that "the notion of 'possession' should not mislead us into thinking that 
what is at stake is property rights. What is at stake is the self, is an individual's identity." Jerome 
Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 448. A Hegelian would 
agree with the second point, that jealousy concems the establishment of identify (or what 1 call 
subjectivity) hut disagree with the assertion that jealousy does not involve property. To a 
Hegelian, property is nothing hut a moment in the creation of subjectivity. 
77 See SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60, at 24; Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, 
supra note 62, at 861-64. 
78 See Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra note 62, at 862. 
79 As Michel Rosenfeld says, according to Hegel "self-consciousness can only achieve 
satisfaction in another self-consciousness." Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of 
Contract, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1199, 1221 (1989). 
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subjectivity—that is, subjectivity requires mutual recognition For 
reasons that are beyond the scope of this Article, Hegel argues that the 
most basic and primitive regime of mutual recognition is the private law 
of property and contract.^o This means that subjectivity does not so 
much require that each individual claim and protect her own property 
rights. Rather, she must first grant and respect the property rights of 
others as a step in granting others the status of subjectivity.^' 
As already introduced,^^ Lacan, following Hegel, believes that 
even as the subject is alienated and envious, she is also essentiaUy 
social—her subjectivity is created by, and only exists within, 
intersubjective relationships with other subjects in the symbolic order 
(the big Other). As Hegel argues, in the modem liberal Constitutional 
state, this intersubjective order is sustained by a regime of property 
the possession, enjoyment, and exchange of actual and imaginaty 
objects of enjoyment.83 Consequently, although the subject may on the 
one hand want to destroy the possession and enjoyment of the other, on 
the other hand she requires the existence of a property regime that 
allocates objects among subjects. In this sense, jealousy is as important 
to her constitution as envy. Jealousy is necessary in that it helps 
maintain the intersubjective regime of property. Envy, in contrast, is 
self-contradictory in that it threatens to destroy the regime of property 
that is necessary for the subject's self-constitution. 
This does not mean that society should necessarily respeet any and 
all claims to property or that we should perpetuate the status quo of 
wealth and property distribution. The question is, how do we tell the 
difference between rightful and wrongful jealous claims to property, 
and between rightful jealous claims to property, and wrongful envious 
desires to destroy the property of others? Hegel argues that a property 
regime is a necessary and appropriate element of the modem liberal 
state, but he offers no advice as to what specific allocation of property is 
80 See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 70 (H.B. Nisbet trans. 
& Allen w. Wood ed., 1991). 
A person, in distinguishing himself from himself, relates himself to another person, 
and indeed it is only as owners of property that the two [persons] have existence ... tor 
each other. Their identity in themselves acquires existence . .. through the transference 
of the property of the one to the other by common will and with due respect of the 
rights of both—that is, by contract. 
81 Consequently, Hegel believes that only the "most uncultured," "stubborn," and 
"emotionally limited" people "insist most strongly on their nghts." Id. at 69. I explain this 
dialectic in Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra note 62, at 873-82; SCHROEDER, THE VEST , 
supra note 60, at 49-52. 
82 it/pra text at notes 62-64. ,. „ ,, 
83 This is the subject of the first section of Philosophy of Right. I explam Hegel s argument 
in SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60, at 15-52 and Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra 
note 62, at 864-70. 
2005] E N V Y  A N D  O U T S I D E R  T R A D I N G  2043 
correct.^'^ He leaves this, as he does with all policy decisions, to 
pragmatic reasoning and positive law.®^ 
We can now return to the law of insider trading. 
III. INSIDER TRADING 
A. Fraud 
Disputes arise over the proper scope of prohibitions against 
securities trading on the basis of material non-public information 
because of the simple, albeit surprising, fact that the federal securities 
laws neither define, nor expressly prohibit, "insider trading."^® 
Consequently, in the absence of Congressional action, if the SEC, the 
DOJ, plaintiffs, and the courts believe that trading on the basis of 
material non-public information should be unlawful, they must imply 
appropriate rules jfrom the general language and policy of the statutes, 
combined with case law developed under the very different legal 
regimes of state corporate and trade secrets law. Indeed, this is the 
single most disturbing aspect of insider trading law—it is essentially a 
common law federal crime. This jurisprudential objection is beyond the 
scope of the specific argument of this Article, although it obviously 
informs it. 
Both proponents and opponents of prohibitions on insider trading 
base their arguments on policies that they wished the law would follow, 
rather than on policies that the statute actually reflects. To 
It is a common misperception that Hegel, like Locke, jtistified property on the basis of first 
appropriation. See, e.g., STEVEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 69-70 (1990). As I argue 
elsewhere, this is a misreading of a single sentence in the beginning of Philosophy of Right taken 
out of context. If one reads further to his discussion of "wrong," Hegel expressly rejects the first-
appropriation justification of specific property claims. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60, 
at 41 n.l24; Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Wrong and the 
Essence of Right: Metaphor and Metonymy in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481 (2003); Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel on Personality and Intellectual Property (2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cardozo Law Review) [hereinafter Schroeder, 
Unnatural Rights\ 
85 In Hegel's famous formulation from the introduction to Philosophy of Right, because his 
logic is retroactive in nature, philosophy always comes "too late" to give policy advice. HEGEL, 
supra note 80, at 23; see Schroeder, The Stumbling Block, supra note 55, at 323-25. 
86 In 1984 and 1988, Congress amended the 1934 Act by adding provisions imposing civil 
liabilities on, and providing for a private right of action for persons trading contemporaneously 
with "any person who has violated any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations 
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security ... while in possession of material, non-public 
information in, or has violated any such provision by communicating such information." 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78t-I, 78u-l (2000). Although this language reflects Congress's agreement that some 
forms of insider trading should be restricted, this legislation begs the question of exactly what 
forms should be restricted. 
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oversimplify,proponents of rules against insider trading tend to base 
their objections on the intuition that it is immoral, unfair, or, as 
expressed in the title of Kim Sheppele's classic article. It s Just Not 
RightCritics and opponents of prohibitions on insider trading tend to 
rely on an economic analysis of law that seeks to promote efficient 
securities markets.The problem with both approaches is that neither 
of the two primary securities acts—the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
"1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 
Act")—contain any language expressly imposing either fairness or 
efficiency criteria with respect to the issuers of securities and their 
affiliates.90 Consequently, while arguments made on fairness or 
efficiency grounds may be of great academic interest and would be 
relevant if Congress were considering a major overhaul of the 
The Article is not intended as a comprehensive treatment of the voluminous scholarship on 
insider trading, merely as an introduction to certain recurring themes. For two recent articles diat 
survey the literature, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: 
Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443 (2001) and 
Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctionallnsider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1999). 
As many have pointed out before me, this is an area of law that has been characterized more by 
incoherence than any reasoned justification. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Insider trading and 
Contracting: A Critical Response to the 'Chicago School,' 1986 DUKE L.J. 628 (1986); Jill E. 
Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. 
REV. 179 (1991); Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic 
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35 (1986); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: 
Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAE. L. REV. 1413 (1992). 
88 Kim Sbeppele, It's Just Not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 123 (1993); see also Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider 
Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 (1999); Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of 
Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REV. 337 (1997); Cox, supra note 87; Gary Lawson, The Ethics of 
Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 727 (1998); Alison Grey Anderson, Fraud, 
Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341 (1982); Victor Brudney, Insiders, 
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
322 (1979); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the 
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967). 
89 See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REV.'857 (1983); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable 
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980); JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: 
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY (1991); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian 
Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to 
Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984) 
[hereinafter Macey, Fairness]; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 
VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970) [hereinafter Manne, Insider Trading]; HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER 
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). 
90 Section 2 of the 1934 Act lists among the many reasons why regulation of the secunties 
markets falls within the federal jurisdiction granted by tbe Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution the need "to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets' and the fact that 
manipulation may "prevent the fair valuation of collateral for bank loans." 15 U.S.C. § 78b 
(2000). None of the substantive provisions of that Act applicable to issuers or their control 
persons, however, contains any express fairness standard. 
This is in striking contrast to state corporate laws which, by statute or common law, impose 
substantive fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care on corporate insiders and frequently apply 
standards of ftmdamental fairness to corporate and insider behavior. 
2005] E N V Y  A N D  O U T S I D E R  T R A D I N G  2045 
regulatory regime, they are of less interest to the judge or lawyer who is 
trying to interpret the existing statutes. In contrast, in this Article, I try 
to analyze insider trading within the statutory policy of mandatory 
disclosure of certain types of information by certain classes of legal 
actors. 
The Acts require issuers and certain other persons to make 
disclosures and file forms with the SEC on certain occasions. The Acts 
frequently impose liability on issuers and certain others for material 
misstatements and certain material omissions.^' The Acts also include 
general prohibitions against fraud^^ and manipulation.^^ Consequently, 
whether or not certain forms of trading on the basis of material non­
public information should be prohibited because they are unfair, or 
permitted because they are efficient, the proponents of these positions 
must word their arguments within language that either mandates 
disclosure or prohibits fraud and manipulation. Indeed, most of the last 
thirty years of insider trading case law can arguably be characterized as 
an attempt by the Supreme Court to rein in the attempts by the SEC and 
the lower federal courts to ground insider trading jurisprudence in non­
statutory faimess considerations.'^ This history is well known among 
securities lawyers and I shall only give an abbreviated account in this 
Article. 
1. Faimess 
The catch-all anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws is 
§ 10(b)'5 of the 1934 Act which makes it unlawful for a person to use the 
jurisdictional means "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security... any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such mles and the regulations 
9' For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act allows purchasers of securities sold pursuant to 
materially misleading registration statements to recover the purchase price from the issuer, its 
directors, the officers who signed the registration statements, and underwriters and professionals 
who expertised a portion of the registration statement (i.e., usually the issuer's auditor). The 
named defendants other than the issuer can raise the so-called "due-diligence" defense that they 
did not know and did not have reasonable grounds to believe (in some circumstances, after 
reasonable investigation) that the registration statement was misleading. 
92 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j (2000). 
93 See 15 U.S.C. § 78e. 
94 This is eloquently expressed in the title of an article by Jonathan R. Macey that traces the 
development of insider trading law; From Faimess to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules 
Against Insider Trading. See Macey, Faimess, supra note 89. Indeed, since he was writing in 
1984 after the Chiarella and Dirks opinions (discussed infra in text at notes 102-07, 120-24, 133-
39), Macey's choice of title is perhaps better described as prescient of the next twenty years. 
95 15 U.S.C. §78j(b). 
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as the Commission may prescribe . ..Rule lOb-5 promulgated under 
this section provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instmmentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any imtrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.^® 
Since the great retrenchment cases of Emst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder^'' and Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,^^ the Supreme 
Coiul; has made it clear that § 10(b)'s litany "manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance" indicates that Congress was codifying the 
traditional common law tort of deception, rather than proscribing 
negligent or unfair behavior or constructive ffaud.^^ Although the 
language of Rule lOb-5 is broader than that of § 10(b), under the basic 
principles of administrative rulemaking, the rule should not be read 
more expansively than the statute under which it is promulgated.'"" 
Consequently, Rule lOb-5 must also be limited to actual fraud.'"' 
The Supreme Court applied this underlying principle to insider 
trading in the seminal case of Chiarella v. United States.Because 
96 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). 
97 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
98 430 U.S. 462(1977). 
99 The specific issue considered in Emst & Emst was whether or not mere negligent behavior 
could constitute a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court fovmd that the 
language of the statute "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud 
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities." Emst & Emst, 425 U.S. 
at 199. Consequently, a plaintiff in a private right of action must establish that the defendant 
acted with scienter. Id. at 201. 
Santa Fe Industries considered whether a plaintiff could maintain a § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 
cause of action against management of an issuer on the grounds that the terms of a merger were 
unfair, and in breach of management's fiduciary duties without a showing that the defendants had 
made a misstatement or omission of a material fact. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 464-65. 
100 "The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the 
administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law ...." As a consequence, the 
scope of Rule lOb-5 "carmot exceed the power granted by the Commission by Congress under § 
10(b)." Id. at 472-73. 
191 See id. 
102 445 U.S. 222 (1980). The Supreme Court was overruling the Second Circuit which had 
sustained Chiarella's conviction on the ground that "[a]nyone—corporate insider or not—^who 
regularly receives material non-public information may not use that information to trade in 
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose. And if he caimot disclose, he must 
abstain from buying or selling." United States v. Chiarella, 558 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), 
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§ 10(b) only proscribes fraud the Court rejected the concept of "a 
general duty between all participants in market transactions to forego 
actions based on material, non-public information."'03 By doing so, the 
Court also implicitly rejected the SEC's holding in In re Cady, Roberts 
& and the Second Circuit's opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
that implied that the rule against trading on non-public 
information applied universally because it was grounded in preventing 
unfairness. In the Court's words, "not every instance of financial 
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity."'"? In other words, even if all 
fraud is unfair, not all unfairness is fraudulent. 
"Fraud" has many elements. In this Article, I concentrate only on 
those that are most directly relevant to the issue at hand. First and 
foremost, fraud requires deception—misrepresentation, or 
nondisclosure, by the fraudster and reliance by the victim.'"^ To put this 
in layperson's terms, deception is the allegation that "you intentionally 
lied to me and I relied on your lies to my detriment."'"" 
Although the federal securities laws are designed to protect 
investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets, even after 
the adoption of the much hyped Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,"" federal 
law applicable to issuers is generally not paternalistic in the same way 
that state law is. The federal securities laws generally applicable to 
i s s u e r s ' "  h a v e  s o m e t i m e s  b e e n  t e r m e d  " r o t t e n  e g g "  r u l e s . A  
rev V, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
103 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
104 40 S.E.C. 907(1961). 
105 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert, denied sub nam., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
106 The Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Cady, Roberts and has on occasion 
stated that it accepts its basic principles including the principle of unfairness. See, e.g.. United 
States V. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983). Despite this, the Supreme Court has consistently held 
that unfaimess alone does not impose prohibitions on the trading of material non-public 
information. Rather fraud can only be established through the breach of a fiduciary-type duty. 
107 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. 
108 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,476 (1977). 
109 The Supreme Court has held that § 10(b) also covers manipulation but reads the word 
"manipulation" as used in the statute as a "term of art" to refer to practices "that are intended to 
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476. 
That is, the Court limits "manipulation," as defined by the statute, like "fraud," to a form of actual 
deception. Fraud, apparently, is deception through words, whereas manipulation also includes 
deception through deeds. 
I l l  S a rba ne s -O x le y  Ac t  o f  2002 ,  Pub .  L .  No .  107 - 204 ,  116  S t a t .  745  ( co d i f i ed  i n  s ca t t e r ed  
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
111 The 1934 Act does contain paternalistic and substantive rules applicable to market 
professionals such as registered brokers and dealers. In addition, the rules applicable to parties 
(including issuers) engaged in tender offers do contain some substantive provisions {see, e.g., 17 
C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f), 14d-7, 14d-ll (2004)) in addition to disclosure obligations. They also 
contain a catch-all prophylactic provision that allows the SEC to adopt rules designed to prevent 
fraud which is deemed broader than § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 (which only proscribe actual fraud). 
See infra text at note 155. 
112 See Panel Discussion, New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Securities Offerings, 28 
Bus. LAW. 505 (1975) (quoting panelist A.A. Sommer, Jr.). 
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substantive rule would prohibit the sale of rotten eggs (or, to put this in 
a corporate context, to enter into a transaction unfair to shareholders). 
In contrast, under the securities laws, "if the investor purchases the 
'rotten eggs' on an informed basis, [the federal securities law] provides 
no relief."'That is, issuers and insiders are allowed to treat investors 
unfairly, so long as they inform investors what they are in for. 
Consequently, under federal law, when a person speaks, she must not 
only speak truthfully, she must also speak completely—^no lies, and no 
half-truths. This standard appears in the language of Rule 10b-5(b) 
quoted above that makes it unlawful "to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading.""'' 
2. Silence 
It is relatively simple to understand what this means as a practical 
matter when a person makes an affirmative public statement—it must 
be true and it must be complete. Virtually all alleged insider trading 
cases, however, involve compete silence, rather than incomplete 
statements—the trader trades without disclosing information in her 
possession. The analysis is much more difficult to apply, both 
practically and theoretically, in these cases. This is because Rule lOb-5 
does not prohibit all omissions (silences) of material facts, but only 
omissions "necessary in order to make the statements made... not 
misleading." Consequently, the rule against omissions applies only 
when either a person has spoken, but spoke incompletely, or if she has 
failed to speak when she has a duty to speak. To find that a person is 
guilty of unlawful insider trading under Rule lOb-5, therefore, we must 
first find that the trader had a duty to make a statement. 
The securities acts impose statutory disclosure obligations on 
issuers and other actors in many circumstances. For example, under the 
1934 Act issuers must file with the SEC quarterly reports on Form 10-
Q,'" annual reports on Form 10-K,"^ periodic reports on Form 8-K'" 
and proxy statements pursuant to Regulation 14A."® There is 
considerable, but highly confusing, case law as to whether and when 
Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed Formulation that 
Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 199, 202 n. 11 (1994) (referring 
specifically to the Securities Act of 1933). 
11'l See supra text at note 111. 
115 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2004). 
116 M §249.310. 
117 Id § 249.308. 
11^ Id. § 240.14a-1 etseq. 
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issuers and other persons must update these mandatory reports. 
Insider trading cases almost always fall within the ambiguous gap 
periods between mandatory statutory reports. 
As Chiarella makes clear, the federal securities laws do not impose 
"a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, non-public information."^2o xhat is, 
silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may 
operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b).... But such liability is 
premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust 
and confidence between parties to a transaction. 
In other words, the mere possession of information giving a person an 
"unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers"^22 (jges not 
itself impose a duty to disclose or refrain from trading.'^s Examples of 
persons who may have a duty to speak given by the Supreme Court 
include traditional corporate insiders, agents, fiduciaries, and persons in 
whom sellers of securities have "placed their trust and confidence."'^^ 
There is, according to the Court, no justification for imposing duties to 
speak on "a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through 
impersonal market transactions."'^^ 
If fraud requires deception, then this implies there must be some 
person or class of persons who is deceived. The deceived person(s) 
must have relied on the misrepresentation or omission to his detriment. 
As I shall discuss below,'^6 one of the problems with the 
misappropriation theory as developed to date is that it threatens to 
disconnect these two interrelated aspects of the fraudster's deception— 
the person to whom the duty to speak runs is not necessarily the person 
who is deemed harmed by the omission. Ordinarily one would assume 
that if securities fraud occurred by definition there should be at least one 
person who could bring a private right of action under Rule lOb-5 for 
securities fraud. But, under the misappropriation theory, there can be 
no such plaintiff! 
11' See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 749-54 
(3d ed. 2001). 
120 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980). 
121 Id. at 230. 
122 Id. at 232. 
123 See id at 227. 
124 Id. at 2n. 
125 Id at 232-33. 
126 See infra text at notes 164-82. 
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3. Informational Advantages 
One major theme that runs throughout this Article is that, even 
among those who intuit that insider trading is unfair, there is no clear 
consensus as to what is unfair about it, given certain basic premises of 
our capitalist economic system, generally, and American intellectual 
property law, specifically. Insider trading—the trading of securities on 
the basis of certain material non-public information—is the economic 
exploitation of an informational advantage by the possessor of the 
information, to the disadvantage of the rest of the public. Consequently, 
the regulation of insider trading can be seen as a limitation on 
informational advantages in the name of a more egalitarian distribution 
of information. But, neither American law generally, nor securities law 
specifically, has a policy of parity of access to information, as the 
Supreme Court expressly recognized in ChiarellaP'^ As I discuss 
below,i28 informational advantages are frequently protected by our law 
as "trade secrets."'^® As Henry Manne states rather sharply, but 
accurately: "Lawyers especially, it would seem, should be very 
circumspect about characterizing the utilization of superior information 
as immoral. That is, after all, their stock in trade."i3o And indeed. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg will paradoxically attempt to ground her 
misappropriation theory—^which reflects an egalitarian approach 
towards non-public information—on trade secret law—^which grants 
monopolistic rights in non-public information to specific legal actors. 
My analysis leads to the conclusion both that Congress has been derelict 
in failing to reconcile these two different regimes of ownership of 
127 5ee445U.S. at 233. 
'28 5ee mAo text at notes 163, 181-82,205-13. 
129 As Manne correctly points out, one of the most important early insider trading cases, SEC 
V. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev W, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), 
demonstrates the seemingly anomalous nature of insider trading law. In that case, the Second 
Circuit held that it would have been unlawful for the insiders of an issuer to trade on issuer stock 
on the basis of material information that the issuer had discovered a very valuable mineral strike. 
"So notice the irony: [issuer] officials buying stock with knowledge of a new ore vein have 
somehow done something immoral, but the company itself buying surrounding land, utilizing 
precisely the same information, has merely performed in a business-like fashion. Manne, 
Insider Trading, supra note 89, at 550-51. 
Manne ridicules the government's position: "nor will it do, as one high official of the SEC 
tried, to distinguish these two cases on the not-so-obviously pertinent ground that 'after all, one 
case involved land and the other securities.'" Id. at 551. Maime is correct that this statement 
seems inane in that the SEC based its case on an intuition that exploitation of informational 
advantages is somehow immoral. I argue, however, if insider trading law is instead based on the 
allocation of property rights, then the SEC's distinction is both logically and legally defensible. 
By adopting the federal securities laws Congress has, in effect, granted a property-like right to 
certain information concerning securities, and only securities, to the investment public. It has 
allowed state law to govem the law of information conceming land. See infra text at notes 191-
97. 
'20 Manne, Insider Trading, supra note 89, at 551. 
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material non-public information and that the resulting confusion has 
encouraged the federal courts' inappropriate extension of insider trading 
law beyond the scope of the disclosure and anti-fraud policies of the 
securities laws. 
How, then, do we reconcile these two competing approaches to the 
law of informational advantages? I suggest that it is precisely the 
contradictory approaches of securities and trade secret law that suggests 
the answer to their reconciliation. Courts should apply insider trading 
law only to that subset of information that our society has expressly or 
implicitly allocated to the public. The public can justifiably be jealous 
if a party tries to appropriate and exploit for his own personal benefit 
such information that is rightfully public. In contrast, insider trading 
prohibitions should not apply to that information that our society has 
allocated to specific economic actors under trade secret law, or 
otherwise. Any objection by the public to the owner's use of her non­
public information is mere envy. The reason why the misappropriation 
theory of insider trading law as articulated by Justice Ginsburg in 
O'Hagan is so troublesome is precisely because it tries to base insider 
trading—^the law of eliminating informational advantages—on trade 
secret law—^the law of protecting informational advantages. 
Of course, by positing my analysis in this form I am arguably 
begging the essential policy question of what information should 
properly be allocated to the public, and what should be allocated to 
specific individuals. This is intentional. Such policy decisions are not 
within the bailiwick of the federal courts or the SEC applying the 
federal securities laws, but of Congress and the legislatures and 
common law courts of the several states. 
B. The Classic Theory 
1. Classic Insiders 
The classic theory of insider trading holds that it is a fraud for a 
traditional corporate insider (such as an officer, director, senior 
employee, or control person of a corporation) to trade on equity 
securities issued by that corporation on the basis of material non-public 
information obtained from the corporation. This rule is rather 
misleadingly known as the "disclose or refrain rule"i3i—if a traditional 
insider is in possession of material non-public information, she must 
either refrain from trading in equity securities of that corporation or she 
131 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1071 (2003). 
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must make the information publie before trading. This name is 
misleading because the trader usually has no right, vis-a-vis the source, 
to disclose the information. Consequently, as a practical matter, this 
may more accurately be a "refrain rule."'32 
Fitting this prohibition within the law of fraud is a stretch or, 
more accurately, a contortion. The underlying problem is that rather 
than seeking implied duties to disclose from within the language and 
policy of the securities acts themselves, the courts and the SEC have 
looked towards state corporate law. This is problematic because, as 
mentioned, since at least Santa Fe and Chiarella, the Supreme Court 
has held that the securities laws generally, and insider trading law 
specifically, are designed only to require disclosure and to proscribe 
fraud. State corporate law, in contrast, imposes fiduciary duties and 
proscribes substantive unfaimess. It is not surprising, therefore, that a 
duty of disclosure based on the latter will do an imperfect job in 
furthering the policies of the former. 
In finding that insider trading constitutes fraud, courts have 
adopted a version of a common law rule of "special facts." Although 
the cases are far from specific in explaining their reasoning, it seems to 
be roughly as follows: sometimes a fiduciary or other person in a 
confidential relationship has a duty to make disclosures to her 
beneficiary. Consequently, a beneficiary is sometimes entitled to rely 
on silence by the fiduciary as an implied negative representation. As 
Justice Powell stated in United States v. Dirks-P^ 
In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from the "inherent 
unfaimess involved where one takes advantage" of "information 
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the 
personal benefit of anyone." . . . Thus, an insider will be liable under 
Rule 1 Ob-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose material 
non-public information before trading on it and thus makes "secret 
profits."i34 
Although rather confusingly worded in the language of fairness, 
the Dirks opinion, in fact, reiterates the basic principal of Chiarella that 
federal securities laws do not impose duties on market participants 
generally merely because they are in possession of information. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court exonerated the defendant (an alleged 
tippee) m this case precisely because he was not subject to the duty to 
disclose or abstain himself, and his tipper, who did have such a duty. 
• '• I discuss below, things are a little more complex in the ease of the most classic form of 
msiders-directors and executive officers of the issuer. This is because, while these persons may 
not have the nght to disclose corporate information in their personal eapaelties, in their corporate 
Sosme considerable ability to cause the issuer to make the appropriate 
•33 463 U.S. 646(1983). 
'34 Id. at 654 (citations omitted). 
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did not violate his duty. By invoking "fairness" Powell seems to be 
invoking state law which imposes fiduciary duties of substantive 
faimess, but only on a limited class of people. Under state corporate 
law, traditional insiders of a corporation, such as officers and directors, 
have fiduciary duties to the corporation and to its equity security 
holders.i^^ 
A duty to speak is derived by analogy to the law applicable to 
trustees with respect to entrusted property. Under general principals of 
fiduciary duty law, a fiduciary may not deal on her own behalf in 
property of the beneficiary entrusted to her care. Non-public 
information generated by a corporation can be considered property of 
that corporation. Classic insiders can be analogized to trustees who 
hold this information as the corpus of a trust for the benefit of the 
corporation and its shareholders. Consequently, for the classic insider 
to use the information for her own individual purposes would be a 
breach of the insider's duty of loyalty under corporate law analogous to 
a trustee's embezzlement of a corpus.'^s in Powell's language in 
Chiarella: 
Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that 
corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder s 
welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through 
fraudulent use of material, non-public information, 
Although I know of no case that specifically does so, this reasoning can 
also be analogized to the law of "corporate opportunity" which prohibits 
an officer or director of a corporation from exploiting a business 
opportunity that should belong to the corporation for his own personal 
advantage, at least not until he first offers the opportunity to the 
corporation.'^^ 
135 "[i]nsiders... have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its 
shareholders." Id. at 655. Once again, this rule requires an additional tweak of the fiduciary duty 
traditionally imposed under state corporate law, as the Second Circuit noted in United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2dCir. 1991) (en banc), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992). 
The insider's fiduciary duties [as applied in federal insider trading cases], it should be 
noted, run to a buyer (a shareholder-to-be) and to a seller (a pre-existing shareholder) 
of securities, even though the buyer technically does not have a fiduciary relationship 
with the insider prior to the trade. . . • j 
Id. at 566 n.2. This is because, as the Supreme Court noted in Chiarella, although the insider 
does not technically have a fiduciary duty to the buyer immediately before the sale, the sale itself 
creates sueh a duty immediately upon its consummation. Consequently, "it would be a sorry 
distinction" to apply a lesser standard to the act that creates the fidueiary relationship. M 
136 As we shall see. Justice Ginsburg makes this analogy to embezzlement in her analysis of 
outsider trading. See infra text at notes 159-62. My criticism of Ginsburg is that she extends tos 
analogy beyond what I believe is the legitimate context of corporate insiders to all confidentiality 
agreements and trade secret law. 
137 445 U.S. at 230. 
138 See infra text at notes 195-97. 
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A literal-minded reading of the rule of fiduciary duty would 
suggest that it would prohibit only the purchase of equity securities by 
insiders on the basis of material non-public information but would not 
prohibit the sale. This is because state law duties run to the 
corporation's shareholders, not to the public generally. This simplistic 
statement does not, however, account for the practical realities of a 
publicly traded corporation in which the shareholders are not a stable 
class of identifiable individuals, but a constantly changing pool of 
investors who buy shares, hold them for a while, and sell them. 
Consequently, for the purposes of insider trading law, one needs to 
stretch the class of beneficiaries of the rule from the class of persons 
who happen to be shareholders on any specific day, to the pool of actual 
and potential future shareholders—i.e., the investment public generally. 
To put this another way, the moment an insider sells an equity security, 
the buyer who had been a stranger instantaneously becomes a 
beneficiary of the insider's fiduciary duty. Intuitively, it would seem 
strange to say that the insider has no fiduciary duties with respect to the 
transaction that creates the fiduciary relationship. 
How does breach of fiduciary duty become fraud? Because a 
fiduciary has a duty not to use trust assets for her own benefit, whenever 
a person accepts the duties of a fiduciary, she is deemed to make an 
implied warranty of fidelity to her beneficiaries. Consequently, it is 
reasonable for the beneficiaries to rely on this implied warranty. This 
establishes the reliance factor of deception. Because of this justified 
reliance, the special facts rule imposes on the fiduciary a duty to 
disclose to the beneficiaries any attempt to breach the duty and invade 
the corpus.^^^ In other words, when a classic insider trades without first 
disclosing material non-public information in her possession she 
violates not only her duty of loyalty, but also her duty to speak. 
Violation of this duty, thereby, constitutes an "omi[ssion] to state a 
material fact necessary ... in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security" in violation of Rule lOb-5. This can be a fraud if the other 
elements of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are met.''^'' 
139 See infra text at notes 160-62. 
•40 There are still problematic aspects of interpreting this as "fraud." Specifically, there is the 
difficulty of identifying who specifically is defrauded for the purposes of private causes of action. 
The insiders' duties to speak run not to any individual shareholder, but to past, present and future 
shareholders of the issuer as a class. They are all equally defrauded by the disloyal insider's 
silence. The problem is that, under the rule of Blue Chip Stamps, only individuals who actually 
purchase and sell securities in reliance on fraud can sue for securities fraud. Consequently, the 
shareholders who did not sell (or potential shareholders who did not buy) their shares are not 
deemed victims of securities fraud. 
Limiting plaintiffs to person who actually trade securities raises its own set of problems. 
First, it is not possible, and may not be advisable, to limit plaintiffs to those individuals who 
actually purchased shares from, or sold shares to, the insider in the public markets. Under 
modem trading practices it is both practically and theoretically impossible to match trades 
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Once again, this is a stretch. The real wrong underlying this 
analysis is that the insider stole property (information) from the 
corporation (and its investors), not that he defrauded them. As 
Saikrishna Prakash has persuasively argued, if the true gravamen of the 
offense were fraud, the insider would be permitted to trade if he first 
disclosed his intention to the corporation's board of directors (or if the 
hoard or the shareholders grant him the right to trade).Indeed, this is 
the rule in the analogous law of "eorporate opportunity"—an insider 
may lawfully exploit an opportunity for his own benefit if he first 
obtains the permission of the disinterested board members or the 
shareholders after making full disclosure.'^2 Moreover, as we shall 
see,i'*3 this is the approach that the Supreme Court will take towards 
disclosure under the misappropriation theory. 
Nevertheless, the courts have not had the courage to follow the 
logic of the "special facts" rule to this logical conclusion and have, 
instead, required the classic insider to either disclose the non-public 
information in his possession—something he is usually prohibited from 
doing for other legal reasons—or refrain from trading. This anomaly 
would be avoided if, instead, the courts had grounded the insiders' duty 
executed over the public markets. Even if we could trace trades, it seems arbitrary to limit 
plaintiffs to those individuals who just happened to have traded with the insider, because the 
insider defrauded traders generally, not any individual specifically. Alternatively, we could allow 
everyone who traded contemporaneously with the insider to form a plaintiff class. This is 
consistent with the analysis that the insider defi-auds the public generally. However, it has the 
problem that it would lead to unacceptably high damages. For example, assuming arguendo that 
Stewart did engage in unlawful insider trading, she avoided approximately $40,000 (or $10 per 
share) in losses by trading the day before the announcement of the FDA decision. Let s assume 
that other persons purchased an aggregate of 100,000 shares of ImClone stock on the same day 
that Stewart traded at a price that was inflated by $10 per share because of lack of disclosure. 
Should they be able to sue Stewart for an aggregate of $1 million? And then there is the 
unfortunate fact that for every shareholder who was hurt by buying at the inflated price, there was 
another shareholder who was helped by selling at the inflated price. That is, under this 
hypothetical, because Stewart only sold approximately 4,000 shares on December 27th, other 
shareholders sold the other 96,000 shares at the higher price. If Stewart had disclosed her non­
public information prior to trading, these shareholders would have lost $10 per share. How is this 
prevention of loss to be factored into the damage award? Congress has partially addressed this by 
adopting § 20A of the 1934 Act, which gives an express private right of action to any and all 
contemporaneous traders but limits the aggregate damages payable to all plaintiffs to the actual 
profits made (or losses avoided) by the insider minus any amount previously disgorged to the 
SEC. Section 20A does not by its terms preempt private rights of action under § 10(b) so these 
questions of liability remain unanswered. 
141 Prakash, supra note 87, at 1495-96. Unfortunately, Prakash tries to argue not merely that 
this should be recognized as the logical implication of the special facts law, but that it is already 
the law. This is incorrect in that there is no case that follows Prakash's analysis in the case of 
classic insider trading (i.e., where the source of the information is the issuer of the securities). As 
I discuss. Justice Ginsburg does adopt an analysis similar to Prakash's in the context of the 
misappropriation theory. e c m 
142 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05 
(1994). 
143 See infra text at notes 168-69. 
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to disclose within the policy of federal disclosure and anti-fraud 
policies, rather than state fiduciary and substantive fairness policies. 
2. Temporary Insiders and Tippees 
A more important problem with the traditional interpretation of the 
classic theory is that a very literal-minded approach to it would seem 
narrowly to limit the class of persons subject to its jurisdiction—i.e., 
corporate officers, directors, controlling shareholders, and perhaps 
senior employees. The courts have addressed this by recognizing two 
classes of remote traders who can be held liable under the classic 
theory: "temporary"i44 (or "constructive")insiders and tippees. The 
former are persons who are not classic insiders who nevertheless take 
on a fiduciary or similar duty of confidence to the issuer either by 
professional status (such as that owed by outside counsel to an issuer or 
psychiatrist of a classic insider),'''® by express contract (such as when 
an independent contractor signs a confidentiality agreement) or 
perhaps by implied contract established by course of conduct (as when a 
classic insider regularly confides and discusses material non-public 
information with a family member for the purpose of obtaining business 
advice).'''® The latter are persons who, as the terminology suggests, are 
tipped off by an insider either because the insider-tipper hopes to 
receive a benefit from the tippee in return, or because the tipper wants to 
benefit the tippee."^ 
•'*4 SEC V. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Gal. 1983). 
''*5 COFFEE & SELIGMAN, supra note 131, at 1106. 
l'® For example, in United States v. Chestman, the Second Circuit, looking to state law for 
guidance, found that duties of confidence can be imposed by virtue of status. Examples cited by 
the court include "attorney and client, executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, 
trustee and trust beneficiary, and senior coiporate official and shareholder." 947 F.2d 552, 568 
(2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992). 
In order to become a temporary insider having duties of confidentiality, a person must have 
a pre-existing relationship with the shareholders of the issuers in which he traded, such as 
becoming "their agent... a fiduciary ... [or] a person in whom [they] had placed their trust and 
confidence." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980). The Supreme Court has 
established m Dirits that mere access to information does not make a person into a temporary 
insider: 
The basis for recognizing this fiduciaiy duty is not simply that such persons acquired 
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special 
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given 
access to information solely for corporate purposes. 
463 U.S. at 655 n.l4. Basic principles of authority suggest that such duties can be established by 
contract. 
l-*® For example, in United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on 
other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985), it was shown that a father became a temporary 
insider because his son, a classic insider of an issuer, "frequently discussed business affairs" with 
him. 
"9 According to the Supreme Court in Dirks, "the test is whether the insider personally will 
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I have foxmd that students have a hard time telling the differenee 
between tippees on the one hand and remote temporary insiders (and 
from misappropriators who I discuss in the next section) on the other. 
Actually, they are easily distinguished if one keeps in mind that the 
former is a reversed mirror-image of the latter. A remote temporary 
insider (like a misappropriator) is given information in a relationship of 
confidence for the source's own purposes under circumstances that 
prohibits the temporary insider from exploiting the information for her 
own purposes or from further disclosing the information to others. In 
contrast, a tippee is given non-puhlic information with the expectation 
that the tippee shall trade on, or otherwise use, the information for her 
own purposes. In other words, when a remote temporary insider (or 
misappropriator) trades on the information, she is thwarting the will and 
violating the property rights of the source of the information. But when 
the tippee trades, she is fulfilling the intent of her tipper (albeit in 
violation of the tipper's duty to the source). 
3. Under-, and Over-, Inclusiveness 
The classic theory is troublesome to proponents of restrictions 
against trading on the basis of material non-public information in that it 
fails to cover behavior that seems equal in culpability. First, it is not at 
all clear that trading even by classic insiders in debt securities of an 
issuer is unlawful. This is because, under state law, the duties that an 
issuer (and, therefore, its insiders) owes to debt holders are contractual, 
rather than fiduciary, in nature, Standard form debt contracts do not 
impose a general duty of disclosure and candor on the issuers of debt.'^^ 
Consequently, the special circumstances doctrine that makes silence 
into a misrepresentation would not seem to apply. It is similarly not 
benefit, directly, or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no 
breach of duty to stockholders." 463 U.S. at 662. This element is met when the insider receives 
"a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings." Id. at 663. 
Tippee liability is prophylactic. It is designed to prevent the tipper from doing indirectly through 
the tippee what he is prohibited from doing directly (i.e., trading on securities on the hasis of non­
public material information received in a relationship of confidence). Id. at 659. Drawing on the 
basic principal that mere possession of information does not create duties, the Court rejected the 
SEC's proposition that a tippee "inherits" the insider's duties merely by receiving the 
information, even if the tippee Imows that the tipper is an insider. Id. at 664. Rather, a tippee can 
only become subject to the duties of the disclose or refrain rule if she assumes these duties. This 
means that the tippee must know "the information was given to him in breach of a duty by a 
person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information." Id. at 661. 
UO See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989). 
151 See, e.g.. Revised Simplified Model Trust Indenture; Model Note Purchase Agreement, 
reprinted in WILLIAM BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS, at A-1, A-35 
(5th ed. 2003) (respectively). 
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clear whether the managers of limited liability companies would be 
subject to insider trading prohibitions because it is not clear whether 
their duty to their members is contractual or fiduciary in nature. 
Second, the Supreme Court assumed that the classic theory does not 
cover the facts of the O'Hagan case when an insider or temporary 
insider of a bidder in a tender offer used confidential information 
obtained by the bidder to trade on securities of the target. The bidder, 
and therefore its insiders, have no fiduciary duties to the target—indeed, 
their interests may be hostile.'^2 
The critic of classic insider trading law may come to the opposite 
normative conclusion from the supporter. If these various cases are 
morally equivalent to insider trading, then whatever is intuitively 
"wrong" with insider trading cannot be fraud. Consequently, it is 
inappropriate for courts to find that even classie insider trading violates 
§ 10(b). If Congress believes that certain trading on the basis of certain 
categories of material non-public information is "wrong" then it should 
enact a statute prohibiting it. This is why the SEC has adopted Rule 
14e-3 prohibiting trading on the basis of information received from 
bidders not as securities fraud, but as a prophylactic rule to prevent 
indirect violations of the substantive requirements applicable to tender 
offers. <m\\ 
lIK In contrast with both the traditional proponents of insider trading, 
and its traditional opponents, I argue that it is indeed coherent and 
appropriate to prohibit classic insider trading but not misappropriation 
on the grounds that only the former is consistent with the policy of the 
federal securities laws that allocates rights to certain information to the 
investment public. 
III mill ill mil 
I 
C. The Misappropriation Theory 
1. Defined 
In O'Hagan v. United States^^'^ the Supreme Court adopted the 
alternate so-called misappropriation theory of outsider trading. The 
difference between the classic theory and the misappropriation theory is 
the identity of the original source of the information. Under the classic 
theory, the source must be the issuer of the security being traded. Under 
the misappropriation theory, it is sufficient that the trader 
misappropriates material non-public information in violation of a duty 
152 I will challenge these assumption later in this Article and suggest that the securities laws 
might imply disclosure obligations in both of these cases. See infra text note 183. 
153 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2004). 
154 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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of confidence to any source of the information. That is, the source of 
the information need not be the issuer of the securities traded and the 
trader need have no duty running directly or indirectly back to the 
issuer, let alone indirectly to the investment public.i^s 
O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm that had represented Grand 
Met in connection with a planned hostile tender offer of Pillsbury. 
Knowing that the price of a target's shares usually rises upon the 
announcement of a tender offer, he bought call options in Pillsbury 
before the announcement and reaped a profit of approximately $4.3 
million when he exercised his options and sold Pillsbury shares after the 
announcement. O'Hagan's actions clearly and unambiguously violated 
the prophylactic rules of Rule 14e-3 prohibiting certain trading while in 
possession of material non-public information obtained from certain 
identified persons in connection with a tender offer. He also violated 
his ethical duties as an attorney to his ex-client. Grand Met. However, 
he did not engage in classic insider trading under Rule lOb-5 for the 
obvious reason that the source of his information was not Pillsbury, the 
issuer of the traded securities. Moreover, because he had no previous 
relationship to Pillsbury, he owed no duties whatsoever to Pillsbury or 
its shareholders. 
Although the misappropriation theory maintains the classic 
requirements that i) silence cannot constitute fraud unless the silent 
party has a duty to speak imposed by a fiduciary or other confidential 
relationship, and that ii) the recipient of the information must trade 
securities, it jettisons the requirement that the person who is defrauded 
and the person (or class of persons) with whom she trades must be one 
and the same. That is, under the misappropriation theory, it is not 
necessary that the duty of confidence (and related duty to speak) run to 
the issuer of the securities (and, thereby, to the shareholders of the 
issuer).i56 Consequently, the Court had to adopt an alternate 
interpretation as to how the fraud "is in connection with" the purchase 
and sale of securities. 
155 Wat652: . • u-
The "misappropriation theory" holds that a person commits fraud in connection with 
a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, when he 
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a 
duty owed to the source of the information Under this theory, a fiduciary's 
undisclosed self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, 
in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the 
exclusive use of that information. 
156 "In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and 
purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a 
fiduciary-tumed-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential 
information." Id. 
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In O'Hagan, both the majority and the otherwise vociferous 
dissenti" assumed that the defendant had no duty of confidence to the 
investment public generally (an assumption I will question later). 
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg expressly stated that the misappropriation 
theory applies only if there is no such duty.^^s Moreover, they both 
accepted the proposition that a person who receives matenal non-public 
information in a relationship of confidentiality defrauds his source if he 
uses the information for his own use. . 
The reasoning is as follows: whenever one enfrusts non-pubhc 
information to a person in a confidential relationship for a specific 
purpose, the recipient of that information makes an express or implied 
representation and warranty to the source that he will not use that 
information for any other purpose. ̂ 59 The Supreme Court had alrea y 
held in United States v. Carpenter^^^ that confidential information 
constitutes property for the purposes of the federal mail and wire fraud 
statute and that the use of the confidential information by the confidant 
for any other purpose can constitute a misappropnation of the property 
of the source.161 jhe source has the right to rely on the confidant s 
contractual representations and warranties of loyalty. Consequently, rt 
the recipient is in fact disloyal and intends to use the information for his 
own behalf, he has a duty to speak and warn the source that it should 
not rely on his loyalty. Accordingly, the use of the information m 
violation of the duty of confidence without prior disclosure constitutes 
fraud—specifically, it is analogous to embezzlement. 
How does it constitute fraud "in connection with the purchase and 
sale of securities?" Justice Ginsburg asserts that O Hagan 
"consummated" his fraud when he used the misappropnated 
information to trade in securities.This aspect of Justice Ginsburg s 
opinion generated probably the most vociferous part of Justice Clarence 
Thomas's dissent. I will turn to the concept of "consummation later. 
157 See id. at 679-701. 
I59 not to reveal his employer's confidential informa^n 
'became a sham' when the employee provided the inforrnation to his 
to obtain trading profits." Id. at 654 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)). 
161 "A coi^pIn/'s^cOTfidential information, we recognized in Carpenter, qualifies as property 
to which the company has a right of exclusive use ...." O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654. 
"'rSdIlemtnfis satisfied because the fiduciary's fraud is constated, not when fite 
fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without dis^sure to his 
princiS he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The secunties 
transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide. 
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2. Trade Secrets 
The Supreme Court's holdings in Carpenter and O'Hagan that 
confidential information constituted property are highly eontroversial 
among intellectual property lawyers who have long debated whether 
trade secrets should be analyzed as property, contraet, tort or as a sui 
generis body of law.^^^ By doing so, the Supreme Court transformed 
trade secret law into property law and virtually all eontractual 
confidentiality breaehes into fraudulent misappropriation of property. 
These interesting issues are beyond the scope of this Article. What 
concerns us is that the majority of the Supreme Court found that 
O'Hagan's misappropriation of confidential information constituted 
fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities within the 
meaning of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. This was Justice Thomas's primary 
complaint, albeit on somewhat different reasoning from mine. The 
problem is that if, as Justice Ginsburg asserts. Grand Met, and not the 
public, was the owner of the information as a trade secret, then the 
investment publie, by definition, has no property or other right in the 
information. Moreover, under trade secret law the souree of 
confidential information, and its confidants, has a right vis-a-vis the 
public, to commercially exploit the information to the detriment of the 
public. Consequently, for the public to complain that Grand Met (the 
source) or O'Hagan (its unfaithful confidant) was using this information 
is not jealousy, but envy—^the pain at seeing others enjoying their good 
luck—and O 'Hagan is wrongfully decided. 
3. Anomalies 
There are some obviously troubling anomalies about Ginsburg's 
formulation of the misappropriation theory. First, despite the fact that 
1^3 See, e.g., Steven Wilf, Trade Secrets, Property, and Social Relations, 34 CONN. L. REV. 
787 (2002); Geraldine Szott Mooht, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of Intangible 
Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683 (2000); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, 
Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade 
Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (1999); David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991); Roger G. 
Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241 
(1998); Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Rucklehaus and Carpenter Signal a 
Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter 
and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminilization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988). Elsewhere 
1 argue that, from an Hegelian perspective, trade secret protection can and should be coherently 
analyzed in terms of property. Similarly, in this Article, 1 argue that it is useful to analyze non­
public information in the context of insider trading in terms of the allocation of property or semi-
property rights in such information. See Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 84. 
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Justice Ginsburg states that such a misappropriation constitutes 
securities fraud, strangely enough there are no identifiable victims of a 
securities Jfraud who could sue for damages. The source of the 
information may be the victim of fraud, but not of securities fraud. This 
is because the rule of Blue Chip Stamps^^ established that to be the 
victim of securities fraud, the plaintiff must show that it purehased or 
sold securities in reliance on the fraud. O'Hagan's souree (Grand Met) 
did not do so, however. This does not mean that absent the 
misappropriation theory, O'Hagan would be able to profit from his 
despicable behavior to his elient. There are already many state and 
federal rules that vindicate the rights of the souree—state trade secret 
and, perhaps, fraud law, state professional responsibility law, federal 
wire fraud law, and Rule 14e-3 promulgated under the 1934 Act 
specifically governing trading during tender offers. Consequently, the 
question at bar was not whether O'Hagan violated the law, or whether 
his source had legal redress, but whether the investment public was also 
harmed. 
Under basic principles of Rule lOb-5 jurisprudenee, however, even 
contemporaneous traders in the class of securities as the misappropriator 
are not deemed to be victims of securities fraud. This is because the 
Court expressly stated that the misappropriator owed no duty to speak to 
these traders. Consequently, they cannot claim to have been defi-auded 
by his silence. 
This anomaly is not of merely theoretical interest because it has 
practical implications for the application of the disclose-or-reffain rule. 
Indeed, in O'Hagan the Supreme Court took seriously the question of 
the substance of diselosure which courts had glossed over in their 
application of the classic theory.'^? That is, if the fi-aud consists in the 
confidant making an implied misrepresentation of his loyalty to the 
source, then the fraud can be avoided if the confidant discloses his 
intent to trade. But note, beeause the misappropriator's duty does not 
run to the investment public, no disclosure need be made to the 
investment public. In Justice Ginsburg's words: 
Similarly, full disclosure forecloses liability under the 
misappropriation theory: Because the deception essential to the 
16'' Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
165 If the trading constitutes unlawful trading, then § 20A of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78t-l) 
gives contemporaneous traders a statutory cause of action to recover the trader s trading profits. 
This is not a fraud action as the plaintiff is not entitled to damages for her loss and has no right of 
recovery if the SEC has previously sought to recoup these ill-gotten gains. Moreover, as 
discussed supra note 140, the language of this section does not define what types of trade violate 
the Act. 
166 Ginsburg realizes this in that she defines the misappropriation theory as applying only to 
persons "who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's shareholders." United States v. 
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997). I will challenge this assumption later in this article. 
167 text at notes 142-44. 
2005] ENVY A N D  O U T S I D E R  T R A D I N G  2063 
misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of 
information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to 
trade on the non-public information, there is no "deceptive device" 
and thus no § 10(b) violation 
In other words, although Justice Ginsburg claims that; 
The misappropriation theory is thus designed to "protect the integrity 
of the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a 
corporation who have access to confidential information that will 
affect the corporation's security price when revealed, but who owe 
no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's shareholders."^^^ 
In fact, the misappropriation theory docs no such thing. Under the 
theory, misappropriators arc perfectly free to trade on material non­
public information to the detriment of the investment public so long as 
they do not "deceive" their sources (i.e., so long as they reveal their 
intent to trade to their sources). 
This follows from the Supreme Court's grounding of the 
misappropriation theory in trade secret law. By definition, only the 
owner of the trade secret has the right to determine who may know or 
use the trade secret.'""' 
Furthermore, the logic of O'Hagan implies that there are at least 
two other circumstances under which persons can trade on the same 
material non-public information without running afoul of § 10(b). 
Justice Ginsburg does not discuss the first circumstance. The source 
would not violate § 10(b) if it were to trade on behalf of the non-public 
information because the information belongs to the source and the 
source has no fiduciary duty to the issuer's shareholders. To state this 
more strongly, to say that the source owns this information is not merely 
to say that the source would not violate the law if it traded on the 
information, it is to say that it has the affirmative right to do so. In the 
specific facts of O'Hagan, such trading by Grand Met in Pilsbury stock 
may have been subject to the substantive and disclosure restrictions 
applicable to bidders in tender offers.'"" In other cases, the source 
would be under no limitations. 
An example of permissible trading by a source is suggested by the 
facts of Carpenter v. United StatesH^ The defendant, R. Foster Winans 
was an employee of The Wall Street Journal who was one of the writers 
of the periodic Heard on the Street column that reports on market trends 
and rumors. Knowing that the market tended to react to information 
168 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 655. 
169 Id. at 653. 
190 See infra text at notes 182-85. 
191 Once again, the tender offer rules impose both disclosure duties and substantive standards 
on the bidders in tender offers. Certain trading in target securities by a potential bidder may or 
not violate these rules. 
172 484 U.S. 19(1987). 
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published in this column, Winans and his co-conspirators would, 
immediately before publication, trade on securities of issuers to be 
mentioned in the columns. The Supreme Court found that the content 
and timing of The Wall Street Journal's articles were confidential 
business information belonging to The Wall Street Journal, and, 
therefore, property.^" Because Winans had a duty of confidence to the 
newspaper pursuant to his employment agreement, by breaching this 
confidence, he had stolen property by fraud in violation of the federal 
mail fraud statute.Although the Supreme Court split on whether this 
also constituted unlawful trading under § 10(b), the reasoning anticipates 
its eventual adoption of the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan. Note, 
however, that in this case, although it might be a violation of 
joumalistic ethics. The Wall Street Journal could have traded on the 
basis of the information in question without violating any federal law.'" 
Justice Ginsburg does recognize the second anomalous 
circumstance of lawful trading: the source could give the confidant 
permission to trade. 
[T]he textual requirement of deception precludes § 10(b) hability 
when a person trading on the basis of nonpublic information has 
disclosed his trading plans to, or obtained authorization from, the 
principal—even though such conduct may affect the securities 
markets in the same manner as the conduct reached by the 
misappropriation theory.'"'^ 
Why a source might do so can be illustrated by looking at the facts 
of O'Hagan. O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm that represented 
Grand Met in a planned hostile tender offer for the stock of Pillsbury. 
O'Hagan used this information in violation of his attorney's duty of 
confidence to purchase call options on Pillsbury s stock making a profit 
of $4.3 million.'" Lawyers are expensive and frequently negotiate 
premium fees over and above their hourly rate for complex transactions. 
Grand Met could, theoretically, have offered that, rather than paying a 
Si! premium fee in cash, it would grant the firm the right to use the 
confidential information to trade in target securities. In this instant case, 
as Justice Ginsburg notes,'" such an arrangement might violate the 
173 See id at 23-26. 
174 Seeid.aill. . .. . 
175 In Carpenter, "[t]he conspirators agreed that the scheme would not affect the joumalishc 
purity of the 'Heard' column, and the district Court did not fmd that the contents of any of fte 
articles were altered to further the profit potential of petitioners' stock-trading scheme. Id at 23 . 
Accordingly there were no facts to support an allegation that Winans was engaged in unlawful 
manipulation under § 9(e) of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)). It seems likely to me, however, 
that the real concern of the DOJ in bringing the case was not so much msider trading, but the 
potential for manipulation. 
176 See 521 U.S. at 659 n.9 (emphasis added). 
177 See id. at 648. 
178 See id. at 657 n.8. 
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substantive and prophylactic provisions governing tender offers. But, 
according to Justice Ginsburg it would not constitute securities fraud 
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 
When Justice Thomas confronted Justice Ginsburg with this 
second anomaly (that confidants may freely trade with their source's 
permission),!™ Justice Ginsburg suggested half-heartedly—and tucked 
away in a footnote—that this is merely an unfortunate example of an 
under-inclusive law. "[T]he fact that § 10(b) is only a partial antidote to 
the problems it was designed to alleviate does not call into question its 
prohibition of conduct that falls within its textual proscription."!8o 
This supposed defense, in fact, contradicts the entire basis of the 
misappropriation theory as articulated by Justice Ginsburg a,nd 
implicitly reveals its intellectual bankruptcy. According to Justice 
Ginsburg, the confidant's use of non-public information constitutes a 
misappropriation and, therefore, a fraud, because the source is the 
owner of the non-public information. Justice Ginsburg has also 
expressly recognized that O'Hagan owed no duty to the issuer or its 
shareholders,!^! implying that they have no property interest in the 
information. If, however, the source has a valid property interest in the 
information, then it should be entitled to use it however it sees fit. 
Indeed, trade secrets are nothing but a monopolistic power of the source 
to economically exploit its information for its own purposes, and to 
keep the information out of the hands of the public. 
Consequently, the source should be entitled to buy securities of 
other issuers on the basis of the information. Moreover, the source 
should be able to transfer "its" property to whomever it wants and grant 
others the right to trade on this information. !^2 
If, however, as Justice Ginsburg suggests, in an ideal world the 
source would not be permitted to give others the permission to trade on 
the basis of the information, then she is suggesting that the source does 
not have a valid property interest in the information as a trade secret. 
But, if the source does not have a valid property interest in the 
179 See id. at 689-90. 
180 Id. at 659 n.9. 
181 text at notes 157-58. 
182 I must once again emphasize that the Supreme Court's choice of O'Hagan to announce the 
misappropriation theory confuses the analysis because O'Hagan involves a tender offer. The 
substantive mles governing tender offers under Rule 14e-3 clearly limit the right of Grand Met 
and its disloyal confidant, O'Hagan, to freely trade on confidential information concerning the 
proposed tender offer. In my analysis, O'Hagan should not be considered a misappropriation 
case because it is consistent with the policy underlying the classie theory. That is. Congress and 
the SEC have allocated rights in information conceming tender offers to the investment public. 
Consequently, public resentment against O'Hagan's use of this information refleets jealousy, not 
envy. Unfortunately, as I discuss throughout this Article, the fact that, under current statutory 
analysis, insider trading must be shoe-homed into the category of traditional fraud prevents a 
court from reaching this result. A consistent insider trading law would, therefore, probably 
require an amendment to the federal securities laws. 
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information, then the confidant should be able to use the information 
without violating the source's rights or committing fraud. That is, the 
proposition that the confidant is committing securities fraud is parasitic 
on the proposition that it is not fraudulent for the source to trade on the 
information. Consequently, in order to find that trading on the basis of 
this type of non-public information constitutes securities fraud, it should 
first be necessary to find that the public, rather than the source, has 
rights in this information. 
LY. SECURITIES LAW AND TRADE SECRET POLICY 
As discussed, the classic theory of insider trading holds that it is 
unlawful for traditional insiders of an issuer (i.e., officers, directors, 
employers, and other persons having a confidential relationship with the 
issuer) to trade in the equity securities of that issuer on the basis of 
material non-publie information obtained from that issuer. The 
misappropriation theory of outsider trading holds that in some cases it is 
unlawful to trade in securities on the basis of material non-public 
information obtained in a relationship of confidence to the source of the 
information who need not be the issuer of the securities traded. 
Although many proponents of the classic theory intuitively find the 
classic theory to be underinclusive in regulating objectionable behavior, 
others intuit that the misappropriation theory risks being objectionably 
overinclusive. 
In this section, 1 argue that by combining an analysis of material 
non-public information in terms of property (or quasi-property) with a 
consideration of the disclosure regime established by Congress in the 
federal securities laws, one can bring some order into the seemingly 
chaotic law of insider trading. I argue that application of the distinction 
between envy and jealousy shows that the classic theory is, in fact, the 
correct analysis of insider trading as a violation of securities law policy 
and the misappropriation theory is an inappropriate extension of the 
doctrine of fraud. Classie theory addresses the righteous jealous fear of 
shareholders that rivals—classic insiders—will take away something 
that belongs to the shareholders—information that belongs to the issuer. 
The misappropriation theory, however, reflects the envy of the 
investment public of the good fortune of other traders who have 
informational advantages. Moreover, this judgment is implicit in 
Justice Ginsburg's internally contradictory language. Congress might 
decide to change the status quo and reallocate property rights in a 
broader category of non-publie information to investors. There might 
also be other good reasons for Congress to adopt broad, prophylactic 
rules governing non-fraudulent trading on the basis of material non-
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public information. The misappropriation theory as articulated to date, 
however, represents judicial over-extension of the law of securities 
fraud. 
A. Classic Theory: Information About the Issuer Belongs to the 
Public 
As discussed, the classic theory of insider trading treats non-public 
information obtained from an issuer as property belonging indirectly to 
the shareholders of the issuer. Many academics who question the 
wisdom of an across-the-board prohibition of classic insider trading 
agree that non-public information should be analyzed as property, but 
challenge the assumption that this information belongs to the issuer's 
shareholders. This argument is based on the technical proposition that, 
under state law, shareholders are not recognized as the legal title holders 
of corporate property, but ignores the fact that the law often recognized 
beneficial and other equitable interests in property. Under basic 
principles of corporate law, the corporation and its shareholders are 
separate legal persons. Property owned by the corporation belongs to 
the corporation, and not its shareholders, even though the corporate 
officers and directors have a fiduciary duty to manage the corporation, 
and therefore, its property, for the benefit of the shareholder. This 
means that under coiporate law, non-public information does not belong 
to the shareholders.'" Critics argue from this that an issuer should be 
able to allocate its "property" in non-public information through private 
contracting in whatever way it deems fit so long as it follows its duties 
to its shareholders. 
This argument is most closely identified with Henry Manne, one of 
the earliest and probably the most vociferous and consistent critic of 
rules against insider trading.He specifically argues that, just as 
issuers may use other corporate assets to remunerate management, 
issuers should be able to grant corporate insiders the right to trade on 
183 See, e.g., Manne, supra note 89; Macey, supra note 89; see also Larry E. Ribstein, 
Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123 (1998); Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the 
Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443 (2001); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parehomovsky, On 
Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative" Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 
(2001); Steven M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between 
Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589 (1999); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 
SUP. CT. REV. 309. 
184 Manne published his seminal book Insider Trading and the Stock Market back in 1966. He 
has continued his losing battle for the legalization of insider trading to this day. See, e.g., Henry 
G. Maime, The Case for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A14. 
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inside information as part of their compensation package.From this 
perspective, concerns about abusive insider trading are, in fact, no 
different than concerns about any other form of excessive executive 
compensation and conflicts of interest between management and 
shareholders. He believes that many of the traditional concems 
expressed by the proponents of restrictions on insider trading can be 
addressed through full disclosure and, perhaps, prior approval by 
disinterested directors or the shareholders.'^^ Indeed, this is the usual 
approach of the securities laws. Concems about faimess should be left 
to state corporate law. For example, in order to keep such 
compensation plans within the protections of the business judgment 
mle, management should have them approved by a majority of 
disinterested directors (if any) or the public shareholders, after full 
disclosure. 
It is often said that insider trading law is necessary because 
investors would flee the market if they thought the scales were tipped.'^^ 
However, as Manne argues, no one has ever tested this empirical 
assumption. One way to do so would be to allow corporate insiders 
to trade on non-public information so long as they disclosed their intent 
publicly and obtained consent from the issuer's board and/or 
shareholders.'^^ If investors find such behavior objectionable, this 
should be reflected in the issuer's stock prices. If stock prices were 
'85 See Manne, supra note 89, at 565, 578-79, 582-83. In Frank Easterbrook's words: 
[IJnsider trading should be permitted to the extent the firm that created the information 
desires (or tolerates) such trading. The firm extracts value through exploiting the 
knowledge itself or reducing the salary of those who exploit it. The firm's decision to 
allow insiders to profit through a given device is the same in principle as any ordinary 
compensation decision, or as any decision to license know-how in exchange for a 
payment. If the managers err in setting their compensation, redress lies in the market, 
which will reduce their future earnings. 
Easterbrook, supra note 183, at 331. 
186 Manne, supra note 89, at 581. 
'87 por example, Ginsburg partially defends her decision in O'Hagan on these policy grounds: 
The theory is also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure 
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.. . . Although 
informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would 
hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated 
nonpublic information is unchecked by law. An investor's information disadvantage 
vis-a-vis a misappropriator with material, non-public information stems from 
contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or 
skill. 
521 U.S. at 658-59 (citations omitted). This concept of preventing informational advantages that 
carmot be overcome is most closely associated with Victor Brudney's argument in his seminal 
article Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws. 
See Brudney, supra note 88. 
188 See Manne, supra note 89, at 555-57. 
189 This would parallel the rule aimoimced in O'Hagan that one can avoid liability as a 
misappropriator if one discloses one's intentions to trade to the source of the information. See 
supra text at notes 169-72. As discussed, Prakash has argued that this rule of permitted candid 
trading is already implicit under the classic theory. See supra note 141. 
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negatively affected, one would expect corporations to react by imposing 
restrictions on trading. Alternately, if prices are not negatively affected, 
this would be strong evidence that investors do not care about such 
behavior. 
B. The Classic Theory as a Corollary of Mandatory Disclosure 
Needless to say, critics attack both the substantive and moral 
assumptions underlying Manne's arguments. I will not engage in this 
specific debate here because I believe it is beyond the limited point of 
this Article. This debate relates to the question of what an ideal federal 
securities policy might be if we were starting from scratch from a state 
of nature before property rights in information have been allocated. I 
am interested, however, in analyzing the issue in the context of the 
given federal securities law regime and current securities practice. 
I agree with Manne that the insider trading law is profitably 
analyzed as an issue of the allocation of beneficial interests in 
information conceived as a valuable asset, regardless of the location of 
legal title. However, I argue that the policy as to how beneficial 
interests should be allocated has already been decided by Congress. It 
is, therefore, not currently subject to reallocation either by regulation by 
the SEC, adjudication by the federal courts, or contract between issuers 
and their insiders. 
Manne scoffs at the claims of supporters of insider trading 
regulation that certain information is the property of shareholders.'^® 
He is technically correct that under corporate law, legal title to 
corporate information resides in the corporate entity, and only indirectly 
to the shareholders who are separate legal persons. But the very 
example he uses to demonstrate that insider trading law is an aberration 
within American law,'®' in fact, illustrates the ambiguity of the concept 
of ownership in corporate law. 
In SEC V. Texas Gulf Sulphur CoJ'^'^ the Second Circuit found that 
classic insider trading by officers and directors violated Rule lOb-5, 
albeit on the now discredited fairness justification. In that case, the 
issuer, a mining company, learned that initial tests indicated that certain 
land contained a potentially rich mineral strike. Classic insiders 
purchased securities of the issuer before this information was made 
public. Manne proclaims: 
'9® See Manne, supra note 89, at 549-50. 
191 Boyle has called this an enigmatic "island of egalitarianism" in an otherwise individualistic 
ocean. See infra text at note 204. 
192 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert, denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
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So notice the irony: TGS officials buying stock with knowledge of a 
new ore vein have somehow done something immoral, but the 
company itself buying surrounding land, utilizing precisely the same 
information, has merely performed in a business-like fashion. 
In other words, far from mandating parity of information, the usual rule 
of American law is the protection of informational advantages. 
This argument is supposed to support his contention that the 
argument that insider information belongs to shareholders is empty, 
"not worthy of serious attention" and fallacious.'^'' To a corporate 
lawyer, however, this analogy is so inapt that it comes close to being 
facetious. Marme's argument invokes the relative ownership rights in 
information of a corporation and a stranger. It does not address the 
issue involved in insider trading—the relative property rights in 
information among an issuer of registered securities, its insiders, and 
the issuer's investors, to whom the issuer and its insiders owe fiduciary 
duties. Manne is suggesting that state real property and general fraud 
law would permit the issuer to buy neighboring land from a stranger 
without first disclosing its non-public information to the stranger. Even 
if this is true, Manne is ignoring the fact that it would almost certainly 
have been a violation of fiduciary duty under corporate law for an 
insider of the issuer to purchase this land for her own benefit. The land 
would be deemed a "corporate opportunity" that belonged directly to 
the corporation for the indirect benefit of its shareholders. 
Consequently, such a purchase by an insider would be a breach of the 
insider's duty of loyalty. This is the more appropriate analogy to insider 
trading. 
Manne's stronger argument is to analogize from the law of 
corporate opportunity to suggest a more appropriate rule for insider 
trading. An insider is permitted to take a corporate opportunity if he 
first offers it to the corporation and, after full disclosure, the corporation 
declines to take it. That is, the modem mle of corporate opportunity is 
not a complete ban, but is a matter of private contract between the board 
of directors and the opportunist coupled with a duty of full disclosure 
that does not apply to contracts among strangers.One might be able 
to argue that, by analogy, insiders should be able to exploit non-public 
information belonging to the issuer if they obtain prior approval of the 
193 Manne, note 89, at 550-51. 
194 Id. at 550. 
195 The definition of "corporate opportunity" differs from state to state and case to case. 
However, the Texas Gulf Sulfur facts would seem to fall within all of the traditional interest or 
expectancy, line of business, and fairness tests. JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIGNS 
LAW AND POLICY, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 788-91 (5th ed. 2003). 
196 As discussed, Prakash goes so far as to suggest not merely that this should be the rule, but 
that it is currently the rule. See supra note 141. This is empirically incorrect. No court has so 
held. 
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disinterested members of the board or the shareholders after foil 
disclosure of their intent to do so. Even if one accepts this analogy, it is 
not clear what the appropriate parallel law of insider trading would be. 
A board may not grant blanket approval to insiders to take foture 
corporate opportunities but must consider each opportunity on a case-
by-case basis. Does this imply that an insider should seek board 
approval each and every time she wishes to trade on insider 
'"^""Mame'also argues that property rights, generally, and o^ership 
of information, specifically, are a matter of positive law and can be 
allocated however society deems fit. In the absence of statutoiy 
allocation, this is left to the private ordenng of contract. This may be 
true as a general rule of American law, but m arguing that it is true ot 
classic insider information, Manne is, however, suppressing an 
important point he makes later in his argument. . , i 
As he admits, his critique "calls into doubt not simp y the rule 
about insider trading, but the entire 'philosophy of full disclosure. 
This is precisely correct: the classic theory of insider trading is 
inextricably linked to the existing mandatory disclosure regime. The 
one is the corollary of the other. Consequently, Manne may be correct 
that absent a statutory allocation of property rights m information, such 
allocation would be left to the private ordering of contract However, 
Manne is wrong to suggest that Congress has not in fact already 
allocated a limited beneficial interest to the public m one class ot 
information.'^^ ^ 
It is my thesis that the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal 
securities laws should be analyzed as an implicit Congressiona 
allocation of an indirect or beneficial interest in information generated 
by and obtained from the issuers of registered secunties to persons who 
trade in these securities. That is, a public corporation must either 
disclose the information to the public (i.e., give actual possession of the 
information to the investment public generally) or use it for corporate 
purposes (i.e., recognize its shareholders' right to enjoy the information 
indirectly through their investment m the corporation). Consequently, 
is consistent with this policy that those who have special access to this 
information should not have incentives to keep the information non­
public by allowing them to use it for themselves. That is, some form of 
197 See id. 
disclosed or completely exploited by other traders. Id. at 562). 
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classic insider trading prohibition is the corollary of a mandatory 
disclosure regime.^"'' 
As Manne understands, if one really believed, on efficiency or 
other grounds, that issuers should be able to adopt policies allowing 
classic insiders to trade on the basis of material non-public information, 
then, to be consistent, one should have the eourage of one's convictions 
and also argue for a major revision, if not a complete abandonment, of 
the mandatory disclosure regime of the 1934 Act. Of course, many 
legal economists do challenge the wisdom or efficiency of the 
mandatory disclosure regime.^*^' It is highly unlikely that Congress is 
about to radically amend the federal securities laws to eliminate or 
severely undermine this regime at this time.^o^ 
James Boyle has suggested that insider trading is a "puzzle"203 
because it is "a statutory island of egalitarianism at the very heart of 
capitalism."204 fact, the better metaphor would be that classic insider 
trading should be seen as only a prominent peninsula of a much larger 
egalitarian continent called mandatory disclosure. 
C. Return to the Misappropriation Theory 
S' t i i  
As discussed above,^''^ the majority of the Supreme Court in the 
O'Hagan opinion grounded its opinion on an analysis of trade secrets as 
a form of intellectual property belonging to the source of the 
information. The problem is that trade seeret law's treatment of non­
public information is diametrically opposed to the federal securities 
laws' treatment of such information. In the previous section I argued 
that the federal securities acts in effect allocate beneficial rights in 
material non-public information generated by an issuer to the 
investment public generally (i.e., its existing and potential future 
shareholders). In contrast, trade seeret law gives the generator of other 
types of non-public information the exclusive right to exploit this 
information for its own advantage so long as it keeps the information 
secret. Federal securities law generally, and insider trading law 
200 Manne claims that proponents of insider trading rules naively "assume that a rule against 
insider trading is the equivalent of a full and timely disclosme rule perfectly enforced. Id. at 
552. I am not making the assumption that forbidding insider trading would encourage disclosure. 
Rather, I am suggesting that it is a corollary to mandatory disclosure rules because it removes one 
incentive to violate these rules. 
201 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fisehel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984). 
202 Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in the wake of the scandals of 2001, reflects a 
strengthening, not a dilution, of this regime. 
203 Boyle, supra note 87. 
204 Id. at 1491. 
205 text at notes 154-62. 
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specifically, is designed to minimize the informational advantages of a 
certain class of persons vis-a-vis the public by granting rights in 
information to the public. It is egalitarian in spirit. In contrast, trade 
secret law is designed to maximize informational advantages of a 
certain class of persons vis-a-vis the public. It is individualistic, indeed 
monopolistic, in spirit. Consequently, any attempt to base an extension 
of insider liability based on trade secret law is doomed to contradiction. 
To do so conflates jealousy—the appropriate protection of one's 
rights—^with envy—the inappropriate desire to deprive another of her 
rights. 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as follows: 
"Trade Secret" means information, including a formula, pattem, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (i) 
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.^''^ 
The Restatement of Torts states that a "trade secret is any information 
that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and 
that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential 
economic advantage over others."20'' The differences between these two 
definitions are beyond the scope of this Article.^"^ What both 
definitions have in common is that trade secrets are non-public 
information that gives the source economically valuable information 
advantages over the public generally. Many commentators disagree 
with the Supreme Court's blanket assertion that trade secrets are a form 
of property rather than "a collection of other legal norms—contract, 
fraud and the like—^united only by the fact that they are used to protect 
secret information."209 Nevertheless, in any case a trade secret is a right 
of the claimant to exploit secret information and to prevent certain 
misappropriation of the secret by others. 
Since at least Friedman, Landes, and Posner's classic article Some 
Economics of Trade Secret Law,^^^ the predominant justification of 
trade secret law is that our society gives a limited monopolistic right to 
the source to exploit trade secrets as an incentive to create this 
206 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537-51 (1980 & Supp. 1986). 
207 RESTATEMENT 3D OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
208 For a discussion of the differences, see generally Chiappetta, supra note 163, at 76-81. 
209 The basis of trade secret law is so unclear that one analyst states bluntly that "there is no 
such thing as a normatively autonomous body of trade secret law." Bone, supra note 163, at 245. 
Bone wishes to limit trade secret proteetion to rights "created by express contract or justified as 
contraet default rules." Id. at 246. 
210 See supra note 163. 




information.211 in order to make it financially attractive for the source 
to invest resources to create this information we give the source a 
monopoly vis-a-vis the public to exploit this information commercially. 
The other competing, or complementary, rationale for trade secret law is 
business ethics—^that is, to prevent certain "bad acts" in the sense of 
independent wrongs (i.e., such as theft, fraud and breach of d^uty).^'^ 
What both of these justifications have in common is the recognition that 
the source has the exclusive rights to commercially exploit secret 
information. The economic benefits of such exclusive rights can serve 
as the incentive desired under the first theory. Moreover, by definition 
the appropriation of control over the information could not constitute a 
"bad act" under the second justification unless one first presupposes that 
the source has valid and exclusive rights in the information that could 
be mwappropriated. . ,1 
Elsewhere I argue that from both a Hegelian jurisprudential 
perspective and as a practical matter, it is both coherent and analytically 
helpful to analyze exelusive trade secret rights as a limited form of 
property .213 For the limited purposes of this Article, we do not need to 
reach the question of proper categorization. Whether we consider a 
trade secret right as property, contract, tort, or a sui generis combination 
of rights, it is a right of the source to keep the information secret from 
the public, and the right to exploit that secrecy. It is a form of 
monopolistic informational advantage. The public by definition has no 
right to the information—in fact, a trade seeret is nothing but the right 
to keep the information away from the public to the public s economic 
disadvantage. j- • 
This is why Justice Ginsburg's analysis of outsider trading in 
O'Hagan is so unsatisfactory. Her entire misappropriation theory is 
211 "Our analysis of trade secret law is congruent with the basic economic explanation for 
patent protection—that it provides a means of intemalizing the benefits of innovation. 
Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 163, at 64. Bone divides the efficiency rationale into two 
forms. "The first argues that trade secret law enhances incentives to create. The second argues 
that it reduces the level of private investment in discovering and protecting secrets ^ well as the 
transaction costs associated with value-enhancing transfers." Bone, supra note 163, at 262. 1 
discuss the efficiency rationale elsewhere, see Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 84, and 
shall not raise it further at this juncture. . u u 
212 Consequently, there are "two separate categories of trade secret misappropriation: breach 
of duty and bad acts." Chiappetta, supra note 163, at 73. For example, the Uniform Trade Secret 
Act, which has been adopted in over forty states, defines misappropnation of trade secrets either 
as "(1) disclosure or use without consent when under a duty to maintain secrecy or hmit use, or 
(2) an acquisition by improper means. 'Improper means' include 'theft, bnbery, 
misrepresentation, breach [of duty] or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy or 
espionage through electronic or other means.'" Id. at 78 (quoting UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 
Un l(2)(ii)(A)). In other words, the Uniform Trade Secret Act makes a clear distinction 
between mere breach of confidentiality and fraud—precisely the distinction the Supreme Court 
failed to perceive in Carpenter and O'Hagan when it found that mere misappropnation of 
confidential information constitutes fraud. 
213 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 84. 
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based on an analysis that the misappropriated information is a tode 
secret that belongs to the source. By definition, a trade secret doeyot 
belong to the public—under the basic logic of trade secret law i 
information belonged to, or became known by, the public, it 
be a trade secret. Justice Ginsburg recognizes this when she stated tha 
the misappropriation theory only applies when the trader has no duty to 
S: ZeZIt public. To say .ha. te disloyal conf.da...-s use o tas 
source's information was wrongful v/s-u-v« .he somce .s^Xse 
source had a valid trade secret m the information. Putting these 
together, the public, by definition, has no entitlement to the information 
and the use of the information does not, therefore, interfere with any 
rights of the investment public. Use of this information cannot, 
therefore, be securities fraud. , 
Justice Ginsburg implicitly realizes this contradiction when she 
opines that the fact that, under her theory, the confidant would not 
engaging in securities fraud if he first obtained the consent of the source 
to trade as an unfortunate underinclusiveness of the statutory scheme^ 
This is also equivalent to saying that, in an ideal world. Congress wou d 
have allocated the property rights in the source s material no^-Pubh^ 
information to the public. This means that the 
allocated to the public, not the source. This is i^c^sistent with he 
grounding of the misappropriation theory m the infongement of the 
source's property rights in its information. That is, the first leg of the 
misappropriation theory (fraud on the source) depends on the judgment 
that the source's property rights in the information are leghim^' 
the second leg (securities fraud) depends on the judgment that the 
source's property rights are illegitimate and that the property righ s in 
the information should be allocated to the public. /^ - u 
Consequently, one can not consistently argue, as Justice Ginsburg 
does, that a misappropriator has stolen trade secrets from the source an J 
that ideally the source would not have the right to grant the right 
others to use the property. Hictinmikh 
A coherent insider/outsider trading policy would distinguish 
between information that "belongs" to the public and info^tion 
belonging to the source. If the information belongs to the public, the 
no one but the public—not even the source—should be able to trade on 
the information without first making disclosure. If the info'^^tion 
belongs to someone else, then the owner of the information should be 
able to exploit the information in whatever way it deems appropriate, 
including by securities trading. If a misappropriator trades on 
information, it should be deemed securities fraud only if the information 
belongs to the investment public. If, however, the information belongs 
to some other party, the law of trade secrets should app y. 
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D. A Brief Aside on Martha Stewart 
The SEC's civil insider trading action against Stewart is based on a 
novel application of the misappropriation theory that would extend it 
even beyond Justice Ginsburg's stated justification. Presumably the 
government first began investigating Stewart's trading in ImClone stock 
because she was a friend of Sam Waksal, ImClone's former chairman, 
who had admittedly engaged in illegal trading of ImClone stock in 
advance of the public announcement of bad news. Obviously, this 
raised the suspicion that Waksal had spoken to Stewart. If he had, 
Waksal would have been a classic tipper and Stewart might have been a 
tippee of a classic insider. Investigation, however, showed that this was 
not the case. t r^i 
The only communication Stewart had with respect to ImClone 
stock on the date of her trade was indirectly with her broker Peter 
Bacanovic through his assistant Daniel Faneuil. At the trial, Faneuil 
testified that he told Stewart that Waksal was trying to sell his stock. 
Assuming the SEC's argument will follow allegations made m the 
DOJ's indictment, it will allege that Bacanovic was a misapproprmtor 
because he violated Merrill Lynch's policy that forbids its brokers from 
piggy-backing on the investment strategy of its clients. That is, a 
Merrill Lynch broker is not supposed to tell his customers what his 
other customers are doing. If Stewart understood that Bacanovic was 
violating his duty then she might be a tippee of a misappropriator. 
I would argue that, in fact, Bacanovic would not be a 
misappropriator under the rule of O 'Hagan. In order to misappropnate 
information it is not enough that the defendant violate a fiduciary tj^e 
duty of confidentiality, as Bacanovic might have done. The infomation 
disclosed must be the property of the person to whom the duty ot 
: - confidentiality runs, otherwise the disclosure is not a misappropnation, 
merely a breach of contract. The SEC would have to, therefore, 
!!!!»• maintain that Merrill Lynch was the proprietor of the fact that Waksal 
was trying to dump his stock. . . ^ j 
Unlike the misappropriated information m Carpenter and U Hagm 
Merrill Lynch did not generate this information itself, nor was it the 
source. More importantly, as we have seen^i^ to be a trade secret by 
definition the claimant must derive actual or potential economic value 
from the fact that the information is not generally known. As I have 
discussed, this means that the claimant has the right to exploit the secret 
for its own economic benefit. To argue that the fact of Waksal s trading 
was the property of Merrill Lynch, therefore, the SEC would have to, in 
effect, argue that Merrill Lynch was entitled to exploit this 
214 &e5«pra text at notes 207-12. 
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information—^presumably by trading on this information on its own 
accoxmt! 
E. Trade Secret v. Securities Law Policies 
Justice Ginsburg's intuition in O'Hagan that there is something 
anomalous in letting the source trade in information, does, however, 
raise a very different and valid concern—should our society grant trade 
secret protection to sources for the type of information involved in the 
misappropriation cases, or should society adopt a positive law granting 
the public generally a property right in this information (as it enjoys in 
information generated by issuers)? This question requires a balancing 
of the competing policies of federal securities law and state trade secret 
law. 
Indeed, one criticism of Carpenter and O 'Hagan from trade secret 
specialists is that the Supreme Court is overly solicitous towards the 
claimed property interests of the sources of information. The Court has 
assumed that the states have unequivocally granted property rights in 
certain information when the state law precedents are far more 
ambiguous. Arguably, Carpenter should better have been analyzed as a 
garden-variety breach of contract suit that did not invoke property, let 
alone fraud, at all. As others have asked before me, do we really want 
to reinterpret federal fraud law so broadly that we are criminalizing 
simple breaches of contract?^*^ 
The trade secret misappropriated by Winans in the Carpenter case 
was The Wall Street Journal's publication schedule.^i^ As discussed, 
the standard justification of trade secret law is that it incentivizes the 
creation of information through the grant of informational monopolies. 
It is intended to prevent potential competitors from using the 
information. Presumably, a newspaper needs a publication schedule as 
a practical matter and does not need further incentives to create one. 
Moreover, Winans and his conspirators were not attempting to compete 
with The Wall Street Journal—ihey did not intend to publish a rival 
newspaper and did not seek to sell the information to The New York 
Times, Forbes, or any other competitor. Consequently, when The Wall 
Street Journal exposed Winans' misdeeds on its front page and fired 
him, it was not because it was worried about competition. Presumably, 
it was concerned with its journalistic reputation—^who would trust a 
newspaper that held itself out as a neutral reporter of business news if it 
was known that its writers were trading on their articles? This may be 
215 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
216 See rapra text at note 173. 
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an important ethical value, but it has nothing to do with the federal 
securities laws. 
Similarly, there may be very good reasons why stock brokers 
should not reveal one customer's trading strategy to another customer or 
otherwise piggy-back on that knowledge. This is presumably why 
Merrill Lynch prohibited its employees from doing so and Merrill 
Lynch was justified for firing Bacanovic and Fanuil for violating the 
terms of their employment. These reasons might relate to the SEC s 
substantive regulation of registered broker-dealers under the 1934 Act. 
It is not clear, however, that these reasons invoke the anti-fraud 
concerns of Rule lOb-5. 
F. Gaps and Anomalies Under the Current Statute 
i Under my analysis, a coherent insider trading law would be 
I grounded on the statutory disclosure duties of the securities law 
I |i' conceptualized as an allocation of certain non-public information from 
L:: the person having a disclosure duty to the investment public generally. 
^ It is a short-cut that allows us to avoid the circuitous route followed by 
5 ! the traditional special circumstances rule. That is, rather than relying on 
E ',!' a multi-step process by which federal law would incorporate state law 
: ' that imposes duties on an insider to a corporation, and on the 
^ corporation to its shareholders, and then expanding this to a duly of the 
corporation and its insiders to all potential sha,reholders (i.e., the 
investment public), my approach would recognize a federal duty 
imposed directly on the insiders of reporting companies and running 
directly to the investment public. That is, the insiders' duty not to trade 
I...... would be reconceptualized as a duty related to the issuer s disclosure 
'j;i» obligations. This analysis would probably leave the theories of 
' t e m p o r a r y  i n s i d e r s  a n d  t i p p e e s  l a r g e l y  i n t a c t .  
Standing alone, however, this analysis may be coirect as a matter 
of policy, but is probably insufficient as a matter of judicial jurisdiction 
and statutory interpretation. The eatchall provision of Rule lOb-5 is 
limited to fraud, and the concept of fraudulent silence is dependent on a 
duty to speak. I have argued that as a matter of policy, an implied duty 
to speak for insiders is consistent with mandatory disclosure by issuers 
and others. Unfortunately, the statute does not contain an express duty 
to speak. Moreover the absence of an express duty to speak, by 
negative pregnant, should probably be read to imply that there is no 
such implied duty. 
The federal securities laws do not currently mandate continuous 
disclosure. Rather, the statute expressly requires disclosures at specific 
times, such as at the end of the fiscal year and each fiscal quarter, and 
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when parties take certain actions, such as making a public offering of 
securities, soliciting proxies, and making tender offers. The 
jurisprudence as to when parties have an implied duty to speak in the 
gap periods between these statutory disclosures is complex and 
confusing. A federal judge might justifiably be reluctant to adopt my 
theory and continue to rely on state law as the source of duties. 
Consequently, a coherent insider trading law would probably 
require that Congress amend the 1934 Act. Ideally, Congress would 
specify when trading on the basis of material non-public information is 
unlawful. Alternately, Congress could change the language of § 10(b) 
to make it more like the language of § 14e-3 authorizing the SEC not 
merely to define fraud (as it does now), but also promulgate 
prophylactic rules governing trading on the basis of non-public 
information. 
CONCLUSION 
Insider trading law should recognize the righteous jealousy of the 
investment public when insiders try to enjoy the public's information 
for their own benefit, but should not encourage the public's envy when 
others enjoy information that the law recognizes is rightfiilly theirs. 
Consequently, a coherent and ethical law of insider trading should begin 
with a consideration of the allocation of property rights in information. 
The misappropriation theory is both unethical and incoherent precisely 
because it tries to graft insider trading law upon trade secret law. The 
federal securities laws reflect a fundamental egalitarian moment in that 
they allocate certain types of material insider information to the public. 
Trade secret law, in contrast, is radically individualistic and libertarian 
in nature in that it grants exclusive monopolistic rights in non-public 
information. If Congress believes that trading on this type of 
information is somehow wrong, it needs to amend the law to supersede 
state trade secret law and re-allocate property rights in the information 
from the source to the public. This would not merely result in a law of 
insider trading that is consistent with the federal securities law policy, it 
would also remedy the current embarrassment that insider and outsider 
trading are de facto common law crimes. 
